

# IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION: PRETORIA)

Case No.

**APPLICANT** 

(1	REPORTABLE: NO
)	OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
(2	NO
)	REVISED <b>NO</b>
ØATE: 26th April 2023 SIGNATURE: _ )	

68355/2018

In the matter between:

ANNETTE VENTER

AND

FIRST NATIONAL BANK 5<sup>TH</sup> RESPONDENT

## JUDGMENT

## KHWINANA AJ

- [1] This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal alternatively full bench of the above honorable court against my judgment granted on this the 06<sup>th</sup> day of December 2022.
- [2] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10 of 2013 the Superior Courts Act regulates applications for leave to appeal and provides:

- (1)Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that-
  - (a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
    - (ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration;
  - (b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of Section 16(2)(a); and (c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties.
- [3] The test in an application for leave to appeal prior to the Superior Courts Act was whether there were reasonable prospects that another court may come to
  - a different conclusion. <sup>1</sup> Section 17(1) has raised the test, as
    Bertelsmann J, correctly pointed out in The Mont Chevaux Trust v
    Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 61:

'It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High

Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cornwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would" in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.'

[4] The applicant's leave to appeal is on my findings save to say the

reasons have been given in my judgment. Having read the papers and having carefully heard counsel I come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion on the order of the court in terms of section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.

In the result:

- 1. Leave to appeal is refused.
- 2. Fifth Respondent to pay the costs of the application.

<sup>1</sup> Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Tuck 1989 (4) SA 888 (T) at 890 (1)

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#### ENB KHWINANA

ACTING JUDGE OF NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA

### **APPEARANCES**

COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT: J W STEYN

ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT: MALETE ATTORNEYS

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: S MANGANYE

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: SWART REDELINGHUIS NEL & PARTNERS

DATE OF HEARING: 1 FEBRUARY 2023 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26 APRIL 2023