Northern Cape Ranchers CC v Sol Plaatje Municipality and Others (118/2024) [2025] ZANCHC 1 (24 March 2025)

19.2 In Mabasa and Another v Municipal Manager: O R Tambo District Municipality and Others,³ the court, guided by Matjhabeng, confirmed that:

‘If regard is had to the relief sought by the applicants, it would have been observed that they want the municipal manager to be found guilty of a crime. This has very serious implications which include possible incarceration for a period of time. That could inevitably result in the deprivation of personal liberty which is enshrined in our Constitution. Therefore, the very idea of a deprivation of a personal right of a person, any person, without that person having been heard is irreconcilable with the jealousness with which the right to personal liberty is and should be regarded and protected by courts. Mr Matomela who refused to comply with the court order citing all manner of excuses was not cited in a personal capacity. This means he cannot be found guilty of contempt of the court order as that could lead to a possible deprivation of his liberty.’

[20] The resultant effect of the amendment, if allowed, would have prejudiced the Municipal Manager, in that he could be found guilty of contempt of court without him first being joined in his personal capacity as a party to the proceedings. The application for an amendment was accordingly dismissed.

[21] On dismissal of the application for the amendment, Mr Olivier, on behalf of the applicant, confirmed that the applicant is no longer seeking a contempt of court order against the Municipal Manager; and that it will request the following final order, namely that:

21.1. The Municipality be found in contempt of the March 2024 order;

21.2. The participating respondents be ordered to fully comply with the March 2024 order within the said period of 30 days, failing which, leave be afforded to the applicant to approach this court on the same papers supplemented, for the joinder of the Municipal Manager in his personal capacity, and for an order for the Municipal manager’s committal to prison for a period of 30 days; and

21.3. The R625 000 claim and future monetary claims.

The application for the filing of further affidavits:

[22] On 12 February 2025, the participating respondents filed a supplementary answering affidavit. The applicant did not oppose the admission of the supplementary answering affidavit on condition that its supplementary replying affidavit is also admitted. In the absence of serious opposition, both supplementary affidavits were accepted into evidence.

[23] According to the supplementary answering affidavit, the following events have transpired since the filing of the answering affidavit:

23.1 The malfunctioning mechanical components in respect of the 15 megaliter module was repaired in full during September 2024;

23.2 The chlorine room that accommodates the chlorination process and that services both the 15 and 33 megaliter modules was repaired;

23.3 The three mobile pumps have been acquired and were delivered in October 2024. These pumps will facilitate the distribution of water discharge from the Kamfersdam to the HWWTW, which would ensure that the water levels at Kamfersdam will return to the 2015 levels. The pumps are, however, not operational as the 3km water pipeline has not yet been replaced;

23.4 The 3km pipeline was purchased by Transnet and delivery is expected at the end of February 2025. The installation of the pipe will take approximately eight months as procurement processes must be factored into the time frames;

23.5 The water levels at Kamfersdam have been reduced drastically as Kimberley Golf Course and Ekapa Mining could resume pumping water from the HWWTW to their respective facilities. This process started in September 2024 (“the Ekapa/ Kimberley Golf Course proposal”);

23.6 According to Mr Mukosi, the raw sewerage discharge has been reduced by 50%;

23.7 For the 33 megaliter module to become fully operational, funding of R106 000 000 is required. A request for funding was made to the Department of Water and Sanitation (“the Department”) in June 2024, but is still under consideration;

23.8 The clear-vu fence had been installed; and

23.9 The Municipal Manager and Mr Malherbe, the owner of Malu Landgoed (Pty) Ltd, met on 04 February 2025 during which meeting Mr Malherbe submitted a proposal to alleviate the sewerage discharge crisis. The proposal entails a joint venture for 30 years, at no cost to the Municipality, to divert discharge to farming areas. (“the Malherbe joint venture”). The proposal will be submitted to the Municipality’s council at the next council meeting. The Municipal Manager has also met with the engineers of the proposed joint venture and the Municipality’s technical team, and they are in principle in agreement with the proposal.

[24] The participating respondents also explain that the reference to June 2024, being the date that the water levels improved, is incorrect and the correct date on which Mr Mukosi could attend to the report was in fact May 2024.

[25] In its supplementary replying affidavit, the applicant, in essence, takes note of the repairs alluded to, but persists that it has not made a material difference to the position that untreated sewerage is still being deposited into the Kamfersdam; and that there is paucity about the practical implementation of the steps alleged to have been taken. The applicant also questions why the supplementary affidavit is silent on the time period it will take to ensure that the water levels return to the 2015 levels, despite the fact that the March 2024 order required the participating respondents to provide a plan to ensure that the water levels would return to the 2015 levels within six months of the order. The applicant disputes that there has been a substantial reduction in water levels; and stresses that despite the allegation that the discharge of raw sewerage has been reduced by 50%, it had to, in terms of the March 2024 order, cease completely by 20 July 2024. The applicant takes issue with the submission that the discharge has been reduced by 50% in view of the participating respondents’ business plan that states that 21.3 megaliters of raw sewerage is still discharged into Kamfersdam daily. The applicant questions why funding of R106 000 000 is required as, according to the participating respondents, the National Treasury has made an amount of R492 000 000 available to the Municipality for the 2024/2025 financial year; and an amount of R574 000 000 for the 2025/2026 financial year, which are enormous amounts of money. The applicant also expressed reservations about the allocation of R106 000 000 allegedly already made during May 2024. The applicant admits that the clear-vu fence was installed, but states that no mention is made of the security installation that the Department indicated as a necessity to prevent further vandalism. The applicant also questions whether the Malherbe joint venture and the Ekapa/Kimberley Golf Estate proposal are feasible.

[26] In addition, the applicant, based on two newspaper articles (Daily Maverick, published on 09 January 2025 and the Diamond Fields Advertiser, published on 24 December 2024), and an affidavit of Ms E van der Westhuizen, an environmentalist who was involved in the retrieval of dead and dying birds from the Kamfersdam, submits that the sewerage bacteria deposited into the Kamfersdam caused the outbreak of avian botulism that resulted in the death of more than 150 birds, with the result that the Department has initiated criminal proceedings against the Municipality for pollution; and its failure to improve the standard of effluent discharge into Kamfersdam.

The contempt of court order:

Applicable law:

[27] As pronounced by the Constitutional Court in Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality,⁴ the rule of law, a foundational value of the Constitution, requires that the dignity and authority of the courts be upheld. This is crucial as the capacity of the courts to carry out their functions depends upon it. As the Constitution commands, orders and decisions issued by a court bind all persons to whom and organs of state to which they apply, and no person or organ of state may interfere, in any manner, with the functioning of the courts. It follows from this that disobedience towards court orders or decisions risks rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery. The effectiveness of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the assurance that they will be enforced.

[28] Courts have the power to ensure that their decisions or orders are complied with, including those imposed against organs of state. In doing so, courts are not only giving effect to the rights of the successful litigant, but also and more importantly, by acting as guardians of the Constitution, asserting their authority in the public interest.⁵ The Municipality as an Organ of the State, and the Municipal Manager as its functionary (the participating respondents), are held to an even higher standard. Not only must they act in strict compliance with court orders, but they are also constitutionally bound to facilitate the efficiency of the judicial branch.⁶

[29] The pre-constitutional dispensation dictated that in all cases, when determining contempt in relation to a court order requiring a person or legal entity before it to do or not do something (ad factum praestandum), the following elements needed to be established on a balance of probabilities:⁷

29.1 The order must exist;

29.2 The order must have been duly served on, or brought to the notice of, the alleged contemnor;

29.3 There must have been non-compliance with the order; and

29.4 The non-compliance must have been wilful or mala fide.

[30] In the post-constitutional dispensation, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie concluded that this standard for a finding of contempt where committal is the sanction is not in keeping with constitutional values and that the standard should rather be beyond a reasonable doubt.⁸ Once an applicant has proved the first three elements, willfulness and mala fides are presumed and the respondent accordingly bears an evidentiary burden thereof. Thus, the respondent must produce evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether the non-compliance was wilful and mala fide, failing which contempt will have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.⁹ Consequently, should the respondent therefore fail to advance evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether his non-compliance was wilful and mala fide, the applicant would have proved contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.¹⁰

[31] The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines mala fides as “bad faith; intent to deceive ”, whereas wilful is defined as “intentional, deliberate; stubborn and determined”.¹¹ Cameron JA in Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd,¹² explained the nature of the test in determining whether the breach was committed “deliberately and mala fide” in the following terms:

“. . . A deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non-complier may genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believe him or herself entitled to act in the way claimed to constitute the contempt. In such a case, good faith avoids the infraction. Even a refusal to comply that is objectively unreasonable may be bona fide (though unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).

These requirements – that the refusal to obey should be both wilful and mala fide, and that unreasonable non-compliance, provided it is bona fide, does not constitute contempt – accord with the broader definition of the crime, of which non-compliance with civil orders is a manifestation. They show that the offence is committed not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the deliberate and intentional violation of the court’s dignity, repute or authority that this evinces. Honest belief that non-compliance is justified or proper is incompatible with that intent” (Footnotes omitted.)

Evaluation of the evidence and arguments:

[32] During argument Mr Volmink conceded that the March 2024 order exists and had been brought to the notice of the participating respondents. He also acknowledged that the participating respondents did not strictly comply with the March 2024 order, but argued that the steps taken, as explained in the answering and supplementary answering affidavits, ousted any insinuation of wilful and mala fide disobedience by the participating respondents. Mr Olivier urged me to grant an order of contempt against the Municipality in view of the fact that no report nor affidavit was filed by the participating respondents in accordance with the March 2024 order.

[33] The crux of the matter is whether the Municipality was wilful and mala fide and why it should not be held in contempt of court for not complying with the March 2024 order.

[34] In order to evaluate the Municipality’s defence, it is necessary to start with the content of the interdict order, which in essence required (a) the submission of the technical report on or before 22 May 2024, setting out the steps to be taken and the timeframes within which they would be taken to address the applicant’s concerns about the discharge of untreated sewage/sewerage into the Kamfersdam or onto the properties, which original technical report had to be filed at the office of the Registrar; and (b) an explanatory affidavit to address the compliance, or in the event of non-compliance, the steps to be taken and the timeframes within which they would be taken, which affidavit had to be filed on 27 June 2024.

[35]. The participating respondents’ submissions regarding the submission of the technical reports are rather disingenuous. I am persuaded that the May 2024 report is the same as the May 2023 report, save that the date is different, the report is not addressed to the Department and that the issue that existed with the chlorine leak is addressed. The two mutually destructive explanations about Mr Mukosi’s availability to attend to the report cast doubt on the veracity of these allegations. In my view, no satisfactory explanation is provided in the answering or supplementary answering affidavits about the concerns of the applicant in this regard. Furthermore, neither report were delivered to the Office of the Registrar. Be it as it may, two reports, containing proposed steps and timeframes, are extant.

[36] The question is, do these incongruities establish mala fide and wilful disobedience of the March 2024 order? To my mind, it does not. Both the May 2023 and the May 2024 reports contain timeframes, albeit non-specific, within which timeframes, specified steps would be taken, including a vague indication of the amounts that would be allocated in respect of each step. On a strict and purposive interpretation, this is in line with the March 2024 order, which was similarly worded and required nothing more from the participating respondents. In retrospect, the terms of the March 2024 order as agreed to between the parties are not defined with sufficient particularity to ensure the effective implementation thereof. I am therefore persuaded, on a consideration of all the evidence, including the other incentives taken, that the Municipality was not wilful and mala fide in its disobedience of the March 2024 order.

The compliance order:

[37] My findings in respect of the order for contempt is, however, not the end of the matter.

[38] It is not difficult to understand the reasoning behind the March 2024 order. A cursory glance at the following provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) justifies same:

38.1 Since the advent of the Constitution , the Bill of Rights incorporated therein serves as a cornerstone of our democracy. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.¹³ Section 8(1) of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.

38.2 Section 24 of the Constitution provides that:

‘Everyone has the right –

(a). to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and

(b). to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that-

(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;

(ii) promote conservation; and

(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.’

38.3 Section 41(1) inter alia provides that all spheres of government and all organs of state within its sphere must secure the well-being of the people of the Republic;

38.4 Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that the object of the Local Government is inter alia to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner and in terms of Section 152(1)(d), to promote a safe and healthy environment;

38.5 Section 153 of the Constitution provides that a municipality must structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community;

38.6 Section 156(1)(a) further provides that a municipality has executive authority in respect of and has the right to administer the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 to the Constitution. Part B of Schedule 4 inter alia provides that the municipality will have executive authority in respect of water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic wastewater and sewerage disposal systems.

[39] The preamble to the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 acknowledges the duty of all spheres of government to ensure that water supply services and sanitation services are provided in a manner that is efficient, equitable and sustainable; and confirms that municipalities have the authority to administer water supply and sanitation services within the limits of physical and financial feasibility.

[40] It is evident from the evidence placed before the Court, even by the participating respondents themselves, that at the time the March 2024 order was made, and at the time the contempt and compliance application was argued, the sewage problem as contemplated within the interdict had not been resolved at all, despite the steps taken by the participating respondents’ as set out in the supplementary answering affidavit. The participating respondents’ submission that funding in the amount of R106 000 000 is required for the repair of the 33 megaliter module is absolutely astounding as it is contrary to the common cause facts that a submission for funding had been made to the Department during June 2024. It is also common cause that the Department had made available an amount of R492 000 000 for the 2024/2025 financial year; and an amount of R574 000 000 for the 2025/2026 financial year to the Municipality for water infrastructure refurbishment.

[41] I am thus of the opinion that the facts of the present matter necessitate that the Court intervenes to ensure proper compliance by issuing a structured interdict to alleviate not only the applicant’s plight but to ensure that the Municipality adheres to its constitutional obligations for those whose interests it is there to serve. To provide an effective order, this court relies upon its inherent discretion provided in terms of section 173 of the Constitution that vests in the judiciary the authority to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice in a regular, orderly, and effective manner. ¹⁴

[42] In Social Justice Coalition and Others v Minister of Police and Others,¹⁵ Kollappen J, with reference to various authorities, discusses the inherent jurisdiction that vests in the Superior Courts in South Africa. In terms of this power, a High Court always has been able to regulate its own proceedings for several reasons, including catering for circumstances not adequately covered by the Uniform Rules and generally ensuring the efficient administration of the courts’ judicial functions. Kollappen J inter alia held as follows:

‘[54] The Rules of court provide both details of substance and of procedure that govern the litigation of disputes, and it would be fair to say that those rules seek to broadly achieve the fair and efficient management of the litigation process. Fairness is ensured by allowing the proper participation of parties and the full ventilation of issues and efficiency is advanced through the regulation of timelines and time periods that apply in the litigation process.

And,

. . .

‘[72] This Court in SABC,¹⁶ described the provision as an important one, pointing out that the only qualification on the exercise of the power contained in section 173 was that the Court must take into account the interests of justice. This Court said in that context:

“Courts, therefore, must be independent and impartial. The power recognised in section 173 is a key tool for courts to ensure their own independence and impartiality. It recognises that courts have the inherent power to regulate and protect their own process. A primary purpose for the exercise of that power must be to ensure that proceedings before courts are fair. It is therefore fitting that the only qualification on the exercise of that power contained in section 173 is that courts in exercising this power must take into account the interests of justice.’”

[73] This Court went on to state that:

‘In my view it must be added that the power conferred on the High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and [the Constitutional Court] in section 173 is not an unbounded additional instrument to limit or deny vested or entrenched rights. The power in section 173 vests in the judiciary the authority to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice in a regular, orderly, and effective manner. Said otherwise, it is the authority to prevent any possible abuse of process and to allow a Court to act effectively within its jurisdiction. However, the inherent power to regulate and control process and to preserve what is in the interests of justice does not translate into judicial authority to impinge on a right that has otherwise vested or has been conferred by the Constitution.’

The claims for compensation:

[43] In addition to the contempt order and compliance order, the applicant alleges that the Municipality, in acting in contravention of the deed of servitude, is contaminating the Farm and the wetlands /natural water resources on the Farm, rendering it useless for conservation and commercial farming. The applicant avers that it has been deprived of 50% of the surface area of the Farm; and 70% of Kenilworth as a result of the negligence and failures of the participating respondents to adhere to the terms of the servitude agreement and according to extensive enquiries made, the applicant determined that the market related rental for agricultural land in the area of the Farm and Kenilworth amounts to an average of R250 per hectare per year since 2020 when the flooding started, on which basis the applicant claims past compensation for damages in the amount of R625 000; and for future penalties in the amount of R125 000 per annum up until the participating respondents have fully complied with the March 2024 order.

[44] The participating respondents oppose the monetary claims of the applicant on the following basis:

44.1. The participating respondents deny that the Municipality has “completely flooded Kenilworth and that the Farm is rendered useless”;

44.2. The participating respondents also deny the amount of the quantum claimed on the basis that the reasonable market related rental for agricultural land is less than R250 per hectare;

44.3. The applicant is seeking to enforce a damages claim in the form of an application, which is not competent in view of the dispute of facts;

44.4. The flooding commenced five years ago, which renders a considerable part of the R625 000 claim expunged by prescription; and

44.5. It is legally untenable to claim the future damages.

[45] In reply, the applicant confirms that it is not seeking the monetary claims for damages, but the imposition of a penalty for the participating respondents’ failure to comply with the March 2024 order, the deed of servitude and the laws regulating the quality of water permitted to be deposited into a natural water source.

[46] I agree with Mr Volmink that the applicant moved the goalposts by first claiming damages; and then, later on, penalties.

[47] Both the claims for compensation involve disputes of fact pertaining to the merits as the participating respondents deny the complete flooding of Kenilworth and the allegations that it has been rendered useless. Neither party has provided me with sufficient and clear evidence in this regard or by what date the complete flooding occurred, which would have placed me in a position to reach any conclusion on the papers in this regard.¹⁷

[48] The award of monetary damages for a constitutional breach has been accepted in principle since the dawn of the Constitution.¹⁸ Mr Olivier, with reliance on MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate (“Kate”)¹⁹ argued that this Court is entitled to apply the same principles to a claim of penalties.

[49] The question that remains is how to measure that loss in monetary terms. In Kate, the Court awarded damages equivalent to 15,5% (the prescribed rate of interest per annum) calculated from 1 September 1999, from the date the unlawful delay of payment commenced.

[50] In casu, the amended deed of servitude does not contain a penalty provision, and neither was I referred to any mechanism to measure the penalties for the constitutional breaches. In view of my finding that factual disputes exist that cannot be resolved on the papers, the amount of R250 per hectare per year does not assist the applicant in respect of the R625 000 claim.

[51] With regard to the future claims, the Court in Coetzee v SA Railways & Harbours,²⁰, stated:

‘The cases . . . go only to this extent, that if a person sues for accrued damages, he must also claim prospective damages or forfeit them. But I know of no case which goes so far as to say that a person who has as yet sustained no damage, can sue for damages which may possibly be sustained in the future. Prospective damages may be awarded as ancillary to accrued damages, but they have no separate, independent force as ground of action.’

[52] In SAsfin (Pty) Ltd v Jessop and Another,²¹ quoting Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, the Court confirmed that because negligence does not become actionable without proof of damage, it is only after damage has been suffered that the cause of action becomes complete, and time begins to run.

[53] For the above reasons, the future claims stand to be dismissed.

Costs:

[54] Despite my finding that the Municipality was not wilful or mala fide, the participating respondents have shown a careless and negligent disregard to the importance of the matter, not only to the applicant but also to the City of Kimberley and the members of their community. I reach this conclusion in view of the cavalier approach to the implementation of the March 2024 order. Even though they conceded that the application is of a serious nature, one would expect the participating respondents to have a robust approach to resolve the disaster and not only to wait until the eleventh hour to disclose to the applicant, and the court, what had transpired since the filing of the answering affidavit. Their conduct vis-a-vis the consent order and the manner in which they dealt with the two reports leaves much to be desired and also warrants censure. In the circumstances, it would be just and equitable that the participating respondents pay the costs of the application.

Order:

In the result, the following order is made: -

1. The relief for contempt of court against the first respondent is dismissed;

2. The first and the second respondents are ordered to file, by no later than 12:00 on 30 May 2024, a report on the progress made in respect of the sewage/sewerage discharge on the farms and the Kamfersdam

3. The report must contain the following information: -

3.1. The steps taken as at 20 May 2025 to ensure that:

3.1.1. No untreated sewage/sewerage or waste water with an E. Coli content exceeding the legally prescribed limit (1000 CFU/100 megaliters) is discharged into any portion of the Kamfersdam or any part of the Farm or Kenilworth;

3.1.2. The amount of treated sewage/sewerage or waste water discharged into the Kamfersdam on the Farm is limited to 30 megaliters per day, alternatively to the extent that the water levels in the Kamfersdam should return to their 2015 levels;

3.1.3. The sewerage- and/or reticulation systems and infrastructure in and about the area of the Homevale Waste Water Treatment Works (“the HWWTW”) are repaired and/or reinstated to be fully optimal and at full operational capacity in order to ensure that no spillage, irregular discharge or overflow of sewerage and effluent water occurs over or on to the land in the area surrounding the water resource;

3.1.4. To ensure that the HWWTW and the area around it are properly secured, including the installation of CCTV cameras;

3.2. The progress made in respect of the acquisition, delivery and installation of the 3km water line;

3.3. The progress made with regard to the Malu joint venture;

3.4. The progress made with regard to the Ekapa Mining and Kimberley Golf Estate project;

3.5. The report must be accompanied by a specified budget indicating the amount allocated to each action and the date on which the funds were/would be made available to ensure compliance; and what amount has been expended up to the date of the report;

3.6. The report must be accompanied by an updated expert water analysis;

4. Thereafter, and on the last Friday of every following fourth month, on or before 12h00, the first and the second respondents are ordered to file a report on the progress made in respect of the sewage/sewerage discharge on the farms and the Kamfersdam to this Court by way of delivering it to the Registrar of the Court (“the further progress reports”);

5. The further progress reports must contain the following information: -

5.1. The steps taken, including the commencement date thereof, during the previous four months to ensure that:

5.1.1 No untreated sewage/sewerage or waste water with an E. Coli content exceeding the legally prescribed limit (1000 CFU/100 megaliters) is discharged into any portion of the Kamfersdam or any part of the Farm or Kenilworth;

5.1.2 The amount of treated sewage/sewerage or waste water discharged into the Kamfersdam on the Farm is limited to 30 megaliters per day, alternatively to the extent that the water levels in the Kamfersdam should return to their 2015 levels;

5.1.3 The sewerage- and/or reticulation systems and infrastructure in and about the area of the Homevale Waste Water Treatment Works (“the HWWTW”) are repaired and/or reinstated to be fully optimal and at full operational capacity in order to ensure that no spillage, irregular discharge or overflow of sewerage and effluent water occurs over or on to the land in the area surrounding the water resource;

5.1.4 To ensure that the HWWTW and the area around it are properly secured, including the installation of CCTV cameras;

5.2. The progress made in respect of the acquisition, delivery and installation of the 3km water line;

5.3. The progress made with regard to the repair of all three phases of the 33 megaliters module;

5.4. The progress made with regard to the Malu joint venture;

5.5. The progress made with regard to the Ekapa Mine and Golf Estate venture;

5.6. Every further progress report must be accompanied by a specified budget indicating the amount allocated to each action and the date on which the funds were made available to ensure compliance with the March 2024 order;

5.7. Every report that is required to be delivered to this Court must be accompanied by an updated expert water analyses report, reflecting: -

5.7.1. The faecal coliforms per 100 milliliters;

5.7.2. The Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) per liter;

5.7.3. The pH;

5.7.4. The Ammonia (ionised and un-ionised) as Nitrogen per liter;

5.7.5. Nitrate/Nitrite as Nitrogen per liter;

5.7.6. Chlorine as Free Chlorine per liter;

5.7.7. Suspended solids per liter/l;

5.7.8. Electrical conductivity per milliSiemens per metre (mSm);

5.7.9. Ortho-Phosphate per liter;

5.7.10. Fluoride per liter; and

5.7.11. Soap, oil or grease per liter;

6. The first and second respondents’ obligation to submit the further progress reports will endure until the determination of the final date thereof by this Court;

7. The applicant’s claim for payment of the amount of R625 000 is dismissed;

8. The applicant’s claim for payment of the amount of R125 000 per annum until the first and second respondents have fully complied with the March 2024 order, is dismissed; and

9. The first and second respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs on a party and party scale, scale C.

_____________________

STANTON J

On behalf of the applicant: Adv AD Olivier

On instruction of: Adrian Horwitz and Associates

On behalf of the first and second respondents: Adv P Volmink

On instruction of: Towell and Groenewaldt Attorneys