THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

1.1 Case no: 403/2000
1.2 REPORTABLE

In the matter between:

LEVACK, Hamilton Caesar	First appellant
LEBOLA, Lincoln	Second appellant
HENDRICKS, Mervyn	Third appellant
LE ROUX, Frederick William	Fourth appellant

and

REGIONAL MAGISTRATE, WYNBERG	First respondent
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, WESTERN CAPE	Second Respondent

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Before:	Harms JA, Scott JA, Farlam JA, Cameron JA, and Jones AJA
Heard:	Friday 1 November 2002
Judgment:	Thursday 28 November 2002

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 37 – Order that accused or arrested persons supply voice samples is competent

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JUDGMENT

CAMERON JA:

[1] The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 gives wide powers to police, doctors and courts to ascertain the bodily features of arrested or accused persons. At issue in the appeal is s 37. This empowers police and other officials, and courts before which criminal proceedings are pending, to take steps, or to order that steps be taken 'to ascertain whether the body' of an arrested or accused person 'has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance'.[1] The main

[1] Section 37 provides:
Powers in respect of prints and bodily appearance of accused
(1) Any police official may –
(a) take the finger-prints, palm-prints or foot-prints or may cause any such prints to be taken-
(i) of any person arrested upon any charge;
(ii) of any such person released on bail or on warning under section 72;
(iii) of any person arrested in respect of any matter referred to in paragraph (n), (o) or (p) of section 40 (1);
(iv) of any person upon whom a summons has been served in respect of any offence referred to in Schedule 1 or any offence with reference to which the suspension, cancellation or endorsement of any licence or permit or the disqualification in respect of any licence or permit is permissible or prescribed; or
(v) of any person convicted by a court or deemed under section 57 (6) to have been convicted in respect of any offence which the Minister has by notice in the Gazette declared to be an offence for the purposes of this subparagraph;
(b) make a person referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or (ii) available or cause such person to be made available for identification in such condition, position or apparel as the police official may determine;
(c) take such steps as he may deem necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any person referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or (ii) has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance: Provided that no police official shall take any blood sample of the person concerned nor shall a police official make any examination of the body of the person concerned where that person is a female and the police official concerned is not a female.
(d) take a photograph or may cause a photograph to be taken of a person referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or (ii).
(2) (a) Any medical officer of any prison or any district surgeon or, if requested thereto by any police official, any registered medical practitioner or registered nurse may take such steps, including the taking of a blood sample, as may be deemed necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any person referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or (ii) of subsection (1) has any

question is whether this provision covers the human voice.

[2] In November 1997 five accused were charged with dagga-related offences in the Wynberg (Cape) Regional Court. They were not asked – and have still not been asked – to plead. This is because at the end of March 1998 the Magistrate granted an order under s 37(3) that the accused in the presence of their legal representatives give the State voice samples as specified by a named 'voice expert'. The object was to compare the samples with tape recordings of telephone conversations in the State's possession, for possible later use during the trial. The five then challenged the order in the Cape High Court. Davis J (Hlophe

mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance.
(b) If any registered medical practitioner attached to any hospital is on reasonable grounds of the opinion that the contents of the blood of any person admitted to such hospital for medical attention or treatment may be relevant at any later criminal proceedings, such medical practitioner may take a blood sample of such person or cause such sample to be taken.
(3) Any court before which criminal proceedings are pending may-
(a) in any case in which a police official is not empowered under subsection (1) to take finger-prints, palm-prints or foot-prints or to take steps in order to ascertain whether the body of any person has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance, order that such prints be taken of any accused at such proceedings or that the steps, including the taking of a blood sample, be taken which such court may deem necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any accused at such proceedings has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance;
(b) order that the steps, including the taking of a blood sample, be taken which such court may deem necessary in order to ascertain the state of health of any accused at such proceedings.
(4) Any court which has convicted any person of any offence or which has concluded a preparatory examination against any person on any charge, or any magistrate, may order that the finger-prints, palm-prints or foot-prints, or a photograph, of the person concerned be taken.
(5) Finger-prints, palm-prints or foot-prints, photographs and the record of steps taken under this section shall be destroyed if the person concerned is found not guilty at his trial or if his conviction is set aside by a superior court or if he is discharged at a preparatory examination or if no criminal proceedings with reference to which such prints or photographs were taken or such record was made are instituted against the person concerned in any court or if the prosecution declines to prosecute such person.

DJP concurring) dismissed their review application in June 1999,[2] and later refused leave to appeal. This Court granted the necessary leave in October 1999.

[3] One of the accused died in July 2000. Two of the others (Messrs Levack and Sebola) are no longer traceable at their home addresses and have dropped out of the proceedings. Their appeals must be dismissed for want of prosecution. The two remaining, Messrs Hendricks and le Roux, persist in the appeal, in which the presiding Magistrate is the first respondent. He did not oppose the proceedings and abides the Court's decision. The second respondent, the Western Cape Director of Public Prosecutions, opposed the application and resists the appeal.

CONDONATION

[4] The first issue is the appalling delay that has occurred. The Magistrate granted the order four and a half years ago. This Court granted leave to appeal more than three years ago. The record was lodged in the Cape High Court in April 2000 – more than two and a half years ago. Thereafter both the notice of

[2] Reported: 1999 (4) SA 747 (C), 1999 (2) SACR 151 (C).

appeal and the appeal record were filed late in this Court. Later also the appellants' heads of argument were filed late. The appellants seek to have these lapses condoned. Delays of this kind reflect poorly on everyone involved, and bring discredit to the criminal justice system. The lapses here, which cumulated, are egregious. What is more, the explanation tendered – that the attorney was ignorant of the rules for civil appeals because he 'specialises in and deals almost exclusively with criminal matters' – is by the avowal of the appellants' own counsel completely unacceptable.

[5] Whether condonation should be granted is therefore open to serious question, and the fate of the application must in these circumstances depend on the merits of the appeal itself. These it is desirable for us to address because, we were told, uncertainty in the lower courts pre-dated the decision in the Court below, and regional magistrates took conflicting approaches to whether such orders can be granted. The appeal therefore requires disposal on the main point in issue.

[6] Before I turn to this, there is a further troubling point. The appellants' neglect persisted without intervention from the office of

either the Registrar in the Cape High Court or the Western Cape Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). In *S v Joshua*[3] this Court recently had occasion to deplore a similar (though much longer) lapse where an appeal, also from the Cape High Court, lay in limbo for years with the appellant out on bail. Appellants in such circumstances may have little incentive to bring appeals to finalisation. Close monitoring is therefore essential, and responsibility for it must rest on the DPP. In this case, we await a report the DPP's representative promised on steps to ensure that future appeals will not disappear from view in this way.

GROUNDS OF REVIEW

[7] The grounds of review the appellants relied on in their founding papers were that –

(a) the voice samples the State required did not fall within s 37;

(b) an order that voice samples be provided under compulsion would effectively breach the appellants' privilege against self-incrimination and result in an unfair trial; and

(c) the Magistrate had no power to grant the order under s 37(1)(c), nor had the State laid a basis for bringing the application

[3] *S v Joshua* 2002 (2) SACR *** (SCA) [ABOUT TO BE REPORTED] para 55 per Mpati JA.

within s 37(3)(a).

I consider these grounds in turn.

(A) IS THE VOICE A 'CHARACTERISTIC OR DISTINGUISHING FEATURE' OF THE BODY?

[8] Basic definition is always a good starting point in the search for statutory meaning. In the present case it provides a conclusive solution. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'voice' as '1. Sound formed in larynx etc and uttered by mouth, especially human utterance in speaking, shouting, singing, etc. 2. Use of voice, utterance. 3. (Phonetic) Sound uttered with resonance of vocal chords, not with mere breath.' The voice is thus a sound formed in the larynx and uttered by the mouth. It emanates from and is formed by the body. There can therefore be no doubt that it is a 'characteristic' (in the sense of a distinctive trait or quality) of the human body.

[9] That each human voice is distinctive (although by no means always capable of assured discernment)[4] is also clear. The voice

[4] Difficulties in organising reliable 'voice identification parades' are alluded to in *R v Gericke* 1941 CPD 211 214 and in *R v M* 1963 (3) SA 183 (T) 184F-H. In *R v Galiswe* 1925 GWL 23 the trial

is therefore also a 'distinguishing feature' of the body. The conclusion that the voice falls within the scope of s 37 must follow.

[10] Davis J thus rightly held that a voice 'represents a defining characteristic of a human being'.[5] As he also pointed out, this conclusion accords with both South African and United States authority. In *S v M*[6] Bresler J thought it 'perfectly plain' that a voice 'cannot fail but to be included within this category of "a mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature"'. The Supreme Court of the United States has for decades regarded the voice of an accused as 'an identifying physical characteristic'.[7] The contrary view, Davis J rightly observed, is clearly untenable.[8]

[11] However Davis J considered that this result could be achieved only by applying a purposive approach to s 37. By this he meant that the provision's wording is ambiguous, and that to reach the conclusion that 'voice' is covered, it is necessary to go beyond its perceived verbal signification. I disagree. In my view the literal meaning of 'characteristic or distinguishing feature' amply covers

court excluded evidence of a voice identification procedure because the accused was not warned or told why he was being questioned.

[5] 1999 (4) SA 747 (C) 752C, 1999 (2) SACR 151 (C) 155*g-h*.

[6] 1963 (3) SA 183 (T) 184E-F.

[7] *US v Wade* 388 US 218 (1967) 222-223 (Brennan J for the Court); *Gilbert v California* 388 US 263 (1967) 266-267 (Brennan J for the Court); *US v Dionisio* 410 US 1 (1973) (a voice has 'physical properties', which can be measured) (Stewart J for the Court).

[8] 1999 (4) SA 747 (C) 753B, 1999 (2) SACR 151 (C) 156*f*.

the human voice.

[12] The decision of this Court in *Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re R v Matemba*,[9] which Davis J considered an early example of purposive statutory interpretation, was I think more modest in its purport. The question was whether a palm print was a 'mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature'. Because the then applicable provision[10] expressly mentioned finger and footprints, it was argued that palm prints were excluded. Watermeyer JA (De Wet CJ, Tindall JA, Centlivres JA and Feetham JA concurring), affirming the majority decision (to which he was himself party) in *R v Brown*,[11] held that the general words obviously encompassed palm prints. He said:

> 'It is quite possible that the Legislature did not have the markings on a palm particularly in mind when they used the words "mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature" possibly because it may not have been generally known at the time the Act was passed that the marks on the palm of a hand are distinguishing features. But in my judgment it was for the very reason that there may exist innumerable kinds of marks, characteristics and distinguishing features which cannot be set out in detail that generic words were used wide enough to embrace all. In a similar way no attempt was made to specify in detail the exact acts which the police may perform in order to ascertain whether or not the body of an accused person bears a mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature, because an incomplete enumeration of such acts might handicap the police in the performance of their duty. Inspection of the body may reveal distinguishing marks of one kind, but other distinguishing marks may require for their revelation one or other of the resources of science such

[9] 1941 AD 75.

[10] Criminal and Magistrates' Courts Procedure (Amendment) Act 39 of 1926, s 2.

[11] 1935 CPD 286.

> as microscopic or chemical examination, photography, X-ray photography, prints, etc.'[12]

[13] Exactly the same applies here. The section does not expressly mention the voice. But this is because it is one of 'innumerable' bodily features that the wording expressly contemplates. It is true that the voice, unlike palm or other prints, is not itself part of the body. It is a sound. But the sound is a bodily emanation. And the body from which it emanates determines its timbre, volume and distinctive modulations. Nothing in the provision suggests that the 'distinguishing features' it envisages should be limited to those capable of apprehension through the senses of touch and sight (or even taste or smell).

[14] Hearing is as much a mode of physical apprehension as feeling or seeing. For the sight-impaired it is indeed the most important means of distinguishing between people. It would therefore be counter-literal to interpret the section as though the ways of 'ascertaining' bodily features it contemplates extend only to what is visible or tangible.

(B) ***SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE APPELLANTS' FAIR***

[12] 1941 AD 75 79-80. That the conclusion is 'obvious' is stated at page 80.

TRIAL RIGHTS

[15] Appellants' counsel contended that s 37 deviated from the common law principle, now enshrined in the Constitution,[13] that an accused was entitled to be 'passive' in criminal proceedings. He developed this argument (as the second ground of review portends) by contending that the order granted violated the 'notions of basic fairness and justice'[14] the Constitution now requires of our criminal proceedings and that it would thus inevitably result in an unfair trial.

[16] The argument involves a muddle with two fallacies. But in one form or another it has proved tenacious. Hence it is necessary first to point out the muddle and then to repel the fallacies. This Court has previously dealt authoritatively with the muddle. In *Matemba*,[15] Watermeyer JA drew attention to a trial judge's

[13] The Bill of Rights provides that everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to remain silent and not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against that person (s 35 (1)(a) and (c)), and that every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right 'to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings' and not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence (s 35(3)(h)); considered in *S v Zuma and others* 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) paras 29-32 (Kentridge AJ) and *Ferreira v Levin NO and others* 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras 23 and 91-100. Steenkamp and Nugent in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom *South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights* (2002) chapter 29 p 680 observe that 'It is difficult to see what is added by the express right not to be compelled to make a confession or an admission, for the right to remain silent, and the right not to testify have, in any event, the effect of prohibiting compulsion to make confessions or admissions.'

[14] *S v Zuma and others* 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 16.

[15] 1941 AD 75.

misformulation of issues arising from the non-voluntary taking of an accused's palm print. He said:

> 'That statement appears to lay down two separate and distinct propositions –
> (a) that in the absence of statutory provision an accused person cannot be compelled to furnish evidence against himself;
> (b) that evidence obtained under compulsion cannot be used against an accused person.
> The terms in which those propositions are stated tend to obscure the real issues which are involved, and I do not think that either of them can be accepted as accurate expositions of the law. *The legality of the methods used to obtain the palm print is one matter; the use of the palm print as evidence is another, and these two questions must be kept separate and not combined with one another, as is done when it is said that an accused person cannot be compelled to furnish evidence against himself.*'[16] (Emphasis added.)

[17] Applying the same approach to the present argument, the first fallacy is that evidence derived from an accused's physique violates the right against self-incrimination. Differently put, it is wrong to suppose that requiring the appellants to submit voice samples infringes their right either to remain silent in the court proceedings against them or not to give self-incriminating evidence. In *R v Camane and others*,[17] Innes CJ analysed and exposed the same fallacy a decade and a half before *Matemba*:

> 'Now it is an established principle of our law that no one can be compelled to give evidence incriminating himself. He cannot be forced to do that either before the trial, or during the trial. The principle comes to us through the English law, and its roots go far back in history. Wigmore, in

[16] 1941 AD 75 77-78.
[17] 1925 AD 570.

> his book on *Evidence* (vol IV, section 2250)[18] traces very accurately the genesis, and indicates the limits of the privilege. And he shows that, however important the doctrine may be, it is necessary to confine it within its proper limits. What the rule forbids is compelling a man to give evidence which incriminates himself. "It is not merely compulsion" says *Wigmore* (section 2263)[19] "that is the kernel of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion." It is important to bear this in mind, because a man may be compelled, when in Court, to do what he would rather not. His features may be of importance, and he may be made to show them; his complexion, his stature, mutilations, or marks on his body, may be relevant points, and he may be compelled to show them to the Court. That is what *Wigmore* calls autoptic evidence (vol II, section 1150)[20] which is perceived by the Court itself, and which it has a right to see. In such cases the man is really passive. But he cannot be forced to go further and to give evidence against himself.'[21]

[18] Despite the clarity of Innes CJ's pronouncement, the fallacy has endured. Fifteen years later, Watermeyer JA had to rebut it again, at length, in *Matemba*.[22] He concluded:

> 'Now, where a palm print is being taken from an accused person he is, as pointed out by Innes CJ in *Rex v Camane* (1925 AD at p 575), entirely passive. He is not being compelled to give evidence or to confess, any more than he is being compelled to give evidence or confess when his photograph is being taken or when he is put upon an identification parade or when he is made to show a scar in Court. In my judgment, therefore, neither the maxim *nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere* nor the confession rule make inadmissible palm prints compulsorily taken.'

[19] Notwithstanding the authority of these expositions, the task of explaining that 'autoptic evidence' – evidence derived from the accused's own bodily features – does not infringe the right to

[18] See now *Wigmore on Evidence*, McNaughton Revision (1961) vol 8 para 2250.
[19] See now *Wigmore on Evidence*, McNaughton Revision (1961) vol 8 para 2263.
[20] See now *Wigmore on Evidence*, revised by Chadbourn (1972) vol 4 para 1150.
[21] Cited with approval in *S v Zuma and others* 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 31 and in *Ferreira v Levin NO and others* 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras 23 and 96.
[22] 1941 AD 75 80-83.

silence nor the right not to be compelled to give evidence has continued to fall upon judges.[23] The explanations given in these cases apply in all details to the human voice.[24] It falls within the same category as complexion, stature, mutilations, marks and prints.

[20] It is of course true that to take a palm- or fingerprint, or to draw blood from an accused, or to require him to supply a voice sample, goes further than merely observing his features or complexion when he appears in court. Our legal system recognises the distinction. It is for this reason that Ackermann J held in *S v Binta*[25] that a person who refuses a request to submit to the taking of a blood sample under s 37 cannot, by the mere refusal, be guilty of obstructing the course of justice or of attempting to defeat the ends of justice. The additional means of compulsion that the provision licenses may have to be employed. In the present case, it was no doubt awareness of *Binta* that induced the DPP to seek the order. Eventual defiance of it would

[23] *Nkosi v Barlow NO en andere* 1984 (3) SA 148 (T) 151-152 (Spoelstra J, Eloff J concurring); *S v Binta* 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) 562*d-e* (Ackermann J, Conradie J concurring); *S v Huma and Another* 1996 (1) SA 232 (W) 237-240, 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W) 417-419 (Claassen J); *S v Maphumulo* 1996 (2) SACR 84 (N) 87-90 (Combrink J).

[24] This is also the position in the United States of America (*US v Wade* 388 US 218 (1967); *Gilbert v California* 388 US 263 (1967); *US v Dionisio* 410 US 1 (1973)).

[25] 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) (Conradie J concurring).

found a charge of contempt of court.

[21] Despite this added feature, there is no difference in principle between the visibly discernible physical traits and features of an accused and those that under law can be extracted from him through syringe and vial or through the compelled provision of a voice sample. In neither case is the accused required to provide evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,[26] and in neither case is any constitutional right violated.

[22] The second fallacy in the argument is this. It is wrong to suggest that the order intrinsically violates the appellants' fair trial rights. At present the only question before us is whether an order requiring an accused to supply in the presence of defence lawyers voice samples indicated by a State-designated 'expert' is competent. Those samples have not yet been procured. The 'expert's' report has not yet been prepared. Its value and the weight that should properly be accorded it have not arisen for determination.

[23] All these are issues for determination at the trial, which has not

[26] The *Corpus Juris Juris Secundum* vol 22A para 652 puts it thus: 'The privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by compelled participation in identification procedures, and the compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by such privilege, since … the privilege against self-incrimination protects only against evidence of testimonial or communicative nature', and compulsion to speak does not violate it.

even begun. Once the appellants have pleaded, the trial court will be vigilant to ensure observance of their rights. This will demand scrutiny not only of the methods and procedures applied in procuring the voice samples, but of the quality, reliability and value of the expert evidence about them. The argument that an incipient and inevitable breach of fair trial rights has occurred is therefore untenable.

(C) *THE INTER-RELATION BETWEEN S 37(1) AND S 37(3)*

[24] The review grounds suggested also that the Magistrate had no power to grant the order under s 37(1)(c), and that the State had laid no basis for bringing the application within s 37(3)(a). This attack, too, is misconceived. The Magistrate in fact omitted to specify under what sub-section he granted the order. But that he had the power to make an order requiring the appellants to supply voice samples cannot be doubted.

[25] It has rightly been held that police powers to act under s 37(1) come to an end only when an accused has been convicted, and that, by corollary, so long as the police retain their s 37(1) powers,

a court before which criminal proceedings are pending has no power to make the orders contemplated under s 37(3).[27] This does not however mean that such a court cannot do so under s 37(1). In the present case, the police retained the power under s 37(1)(c) to take steps as they might deem necessary to ascertain the characteristic or distinguishing features of the appellants' voices. This included the power to request the appellants to supply voice samples. This power, in turn, could properly be supplemented by a court order requiring the appellants to do so.

[26] The regional court's order that the appellants supply the voice samples in question thus reinforced and underscored the powers of the police, by making refusal to cooperate subject to sanction for contempt of court. In short, sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) thus do not operate exclusively of one another. A court has the power to issue an order requiring an arrested person (or any other person contemplated in ss (1) and (2)) to comply with a request from any of the officials named to supply the autoptic evidence sought. In the present case, therefore, the police retained the power to request the appellants to supply the voice samples, and the regional court had the power to order that they do so. The

[27] *Nkosi v Barlow NO en andere* 1984 (3) SA 148 (T) 154I-155E (Spoelstra J, Eloff J concurring).

precise source of the court's power is therefore best located as deriving from s 37(1)(c).[28]

REVIEW OF UNCONCLUDED PROCEEDINGS

[27] As is well established, the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 permits intervention by superior courts in the unconcluded proceedings of inferior courts only on limited grounds.[29] I agree with Davis J in the Court below that no case at all was made out that this is one of the rare cases where intervention was warranted.[30] Appellants' counsel sought to argue that the order requiring the provision of voice samples was of such a radical nature, comparable to the imposition of corporal punishment, that

[28] It follows that the order in *S v Huma and another* 1996 (1) SA 232 (W), 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W) should have been granted in terms that made it clear that the accused were ordered to cooperate with the police in the exercise of the powers of the latter to take finger-prints under s 37(1)(c).

[29] Act 59 of 1959 provides:

24 **Grounds of review of proceedings of inferior courts**

(1) The grounds upon which the proceedings of any inferior court may be brought under review before a provincial division, or before a local division having review jurisdiction, are-

(a) absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court;

(b) interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on the part of the presiding judicial officer;

(c) gross irregularity in the proceedings; and

(d) the admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of admissible or competent evidence.

[30] 1999 (4) SA 747 (C) 754A-755A, 1999 (2) SACR 151 (C) 157e-158*a*, citing inter alia *Wahlhaus and Others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg and Another* 1959 (3) SA 113 (A), *Ismail and Others v Additional Magistrate, Wynberg and Another* 1963 (1) SA 1 (A) and *Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division and Another* 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC).

it was final in effect. The argument is not persuasive. As explained above, the provision of voice samples is no different in principle from the provision of a blood sample or a fingerprint. The order granting it cannot, at this stage of the proceedings constitute the sort of gross irregularity that would justify intervention.

ORDER

1. The appeal of appellants 1 and 2 is dismissed for want of prosecution.
2. The application for condonation of appellants 3 and 4 is dismissed.

E CAMERON
JUDGE OF APPEAL

HARMS JA)
SCOTT JA) CONCUR
FARLAM JA)
JONES AJA)