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Citation
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Judgment date
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| December 2011 |
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Acquisition of six light‑industrial letting enterprises approved; low post‑merger shares and no public‑interest concerns.
Competition — merger control — acquisition of six light industrial letting enterprises — horizontal overlap in Longmeadow, Jet‑Park and Spartan rentable light industrial markets — post‑merger market shares below 10% — presence of significant competitors — no adverse public interest effects — unconditional approval.
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22 December 2011 |
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Tribunal approved the merger subject to divestiture to remedy local concentration in Nongoma and Matatiele.
Merger control – market definition (retail vs wholesale grocery; LSM segmentation) – local geographic markets – local market concentration – divestiture remedy to address substantial lessening of competition – public interest (employment) considerations.
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20 December 2011 |
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Tribunal unconditionally approved a civil engineering/pipeline merger, finding no substantial lessening of competition or collusion risk.
Competition: merger approval; Relevant market: civil engineering and CIDB grade 8/9 pipeline construction; Limited horizontal and vertical overlaps; Coordinated effects/collusion risk assessed and found unlikely; Low market shares; No public interest or entry‑barrier concerns; Unconditional approval.
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14 December 2011 |
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A three‑to‑two hybrid maize seed merger was prohibited for likely substantial anticompetitive effects and harm to small farmers.
Competition — Horizontal/intermediate merger in hybrid maize seed markets; market definition — national breeding and commercialisation markets; rejected separate "ultra‑early/irrigation" market; high entry barriers (locally‑adapted germplasm, advanced breeding technologies, brand and distribution); three‑to‑two merger leading to significant concentration; merger simulation predicts material unilateral price increases; claimed efficiencies (trait‑fee savings, dynamic germplasm gains) not shown to be merger‑specific, timely or sufficient; behavioural remedies (limited price cap, restrictive licensing) inadequate — structural divestiture preferable; public interest — likely harm to small‑scale and subsistence farmers; procedural — s45 disclosure dispute dismissed.
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9 December 2011 |
| November 2011 |
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Tribunal corrected the second respondent’s citation in a complaint referral following the applicant’s application and respondent’s consent.
Competition law — procedural amendment — correction of respondent's citation in complaint referral — Tribunal authorised to correct clerical errors with consent of affected party.
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29 November 2011 |
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Tribunal approved the acquisition of the target’s remaining shares under section 16(2)(b), subject to conditions.
* Competition law – Merger control – Approval under section 16(2)(b) – Transaction approved subject to conditions (Annexure A).
* Merger remedies – Tribunal’s power to impose conditions as part of conditional approval.
* Procedural – Hearing and decision dates; redaction of certain information in judgment.
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23 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement where respondent admitted price-fixing and market allocation, fined and ordered compliance.
Competition law – Section 4(1)(b)(i) price-fixing and section 4(1)(b)(ii) market division – information exchange via industry body used to monitor market shares – consent agreement confirmed by Tribunal – administrative penalty and behavioural remedies.
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16 November 2011 |
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Merger in sugar-based confectionery approved unconditionally as unlikely to substantially lessen competition.
Competition law – merger control – confectionery sector – overlap in sugar-based confectionery (panned confectionery; toffees/chews/caramels) – post-merger shares below 20% – no substantial lessening of competition – no public interest employment concerns.
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16 November 2011 |
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Reported
The acquiring firm's purchase of two rebar/mesh businesses approved; merger unlikely to substantially lessen competition.
Competition — Merger control — Acquisition of jointly controlled rebar and mesh businesses — Relevant markets: rebar and welded mesh in Gauteng and Limpopo — Market shares moderate, several competitors remain — Leniency/cartel history noted; target not implicated — Recommendation for competition compliance programme — No substantial lessening of competition; unconditional approval.
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10 November 2011 |
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Tribunal confirms consent agreement finding the respondent facilitated price-fixing of SAFEX storage tariffs and imposes penalty.
Competition law – Section 4(1)(b)(i) – Horizontal price-fixing – Industry association facilitating joint determination of SAFEX grain storage tariffs – Exchange and aggregation of members’ cost information – Consent agreement – Administrative penalty – Compliance programme and cooperation obligations.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement for admitted price-fixing of grain storage; penalty and compliance obligations ordered.
* Competition law – Section 4(1)(b)(i) – Horizontal price-fixing – Joint determination of daily grain storage tariff by industry association (GSI). * Consent agreements – Section 58(1)(a)(iii) read with section 58(1)(b) – Tribunal confirmation and variation of terms. * Administrative penalty – Section 59 – calculation (percentage of turnover), payment and transfer to National Revenue Fund. * Compliance undertakings – cooperation, testimony, production of evidence and mandated competition law compliance programme.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirmed consent agreement finding the respondent partook in horizontal price-fixing of grain storage tariffs and imposed an administrative penalty.
Competition law – Horizontal agreement – Price-fixing – Agreement on daily grain storage tariff – Section 4(1)(b)(i) – Consent agreement under section 49D and confirmation under section 58 – Administrative penalty – Compliance programme and cooperation obligations.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement where the respondent admitted participation in industry price‑fixing and agreed to a penalty.
* Competition law – horizontal price‑fixing – section 4(1)(b)(i) – industry association (GSI) jointly determining daily grain storage tariff. * Consent agreements – section 49D and section 58 – confirmation by Tribunal. * Administrative penalty – sections 59(1)–(4) – payment and transfer to National Revenue Fund. * Behavioural remedies – cooperation, evidence production, and compliance programme obligations.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement: respondent admitted horizontal price‑fixing, paid penalty and must implement compliance measures.
Competition law — Cartel/price‑fixing — section 4(1)(b)(i) — Consent agreement under section 58(1)(a)(iii) — Administrative penalty (section 59) — Cooperation and compliance programme as behavioural remedy.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent resolving admitted horizontal price‑fixing of grain storage tariffs with penalty and compliance requirements.
Competition law – Section 4(1)(b)(i) – Horizontal price‑fixing – Joint determination of daily grain storage tariff by industry association – Consent agreement under section 58 – Administrative penalty and compliance obligations.
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9 November 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirmed consent order where the respondent admitted horizontal price-fixing of grain storage tariffs and accepted a 4% penalty.
Competition law — Section 4(1)(b)(i) — Horizontal price-fixing — Joint determination of grain storage tariffs by industry association — Consent agreement under sections 49D and 58 — Administrative penalty — Cooperation and compliance programme obligations.
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9 November 2011 |
| October 2011 |
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An increased stake in a geographically distant shopping centre did not substantially lessen competition, so the merger was unconditionally approved.
* Competition law – merger approval – horizontal overlap – geographic market delimitation; remote shopping centres not competitors. * Market definition – localised retail property markets – geographic distance (approx. 250 km) precludes competition overlap. * Public interest – employment impact assessed and found absent.
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31 October 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal dismisses jurisdictional objections: Commissioner-initiated complaint not prescribed and inspectors were directed to investigate.
* Competition law – section 5(2) – minimum resale price maintenance; * Procedural law – complaint initiation: distinction between complainant-initiated (s49B(2)(b)) and Commissioner-initiated complaints (s49B(1)); * Prescription/referral timing – s50(2) one-year rule applies only to complainant complaints; * Commission Rules (rule 16) cannot be read to alter statutory initiation/consequences; * Investigations – s49B(3) requirement to direct an inspector and s24 appointment of inspectors; evidential onus on respondent to prove lack of direction.
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27 October 2011 |
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The Tribunal approved a private‑equity acquisition of a catering and refrigeration equipment supplier as non‑anticompetitive and unconditional.
Competition law – merger approval – no horizontal/vertical overlap – supply of baking, catering and refrigeration equipment – no substantial lessening of competition – no public interest concerns – unconditional approval.
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26 October 2011 |
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Acquisition of agricultural lending book unlikely to substantially lessen competition; merger approved unconditionally.
Competition law – merger review – market defined as wholesale (upstream) and retail (downstream) agricultural finance; horizontal overlap in downstream retail lending with post‑merger share 14.15% – insufficient to substantially lessen competition; vertical integration – foreclosure unlikely due to fragmented market and alternative finance; no public interest concerns (employment).
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25 October 2011 |
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Holistic reading of an initiating document showed complainant intention to complain; referral valid against first two respondents but not third.
* Competition law – initiation and referral of complaints – distinction between information (s49B(2)(a)) and a complaint (s49B(2)(b)) – intention of complainant to be derived from initiating document read holistically.
* Competition law – referral must be based on same facta probanda as initiating document; Commission may add particulars (s50(3)(a)(iii)).
* Application of Yara – headings and structure are contextual indicia of intention; holistic assessment required.
* Jurisdiction – referral against third respondent (joined by amendment) not supported by initiating document.
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20 October 2011 |
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Applicant’s Part A relief and intervention applications in two competition matters postponed sine die by agreement; no costs ordered.
Competition tribunal — procedural order by agreement — postponement sine die of Part A relief application and intervention applications in two related matters; no order as to costs.
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14 October 2011 |
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The acquiring firm's control of the target is unlikely to substantially lessen competition; merger unconditionally approved.
Merger control — horizontal overlap in intercity buses, extra heavy duty trucks, and city/commuter buses — market share assessment and volatility; vertical effects — input/customer foreclosure — alternative body-builders and buyer countervailing power; no public interest concerns; unconditional approval.
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14 October 2011 |
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Unconditional approval of a telecom acquisition where no horizontal overlap and negligible vertical integration were found.
Competition law – Merger approval; no horizontal overlap; negligible vertical integration (approx. 0.0027% of turnover); low foreclosure risk; dynamic telecom sector; no public interest concerns.
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12 October 2011 |
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A large property-centre merger was approved as unlikely to substantially lessen competition and raised no public-interest concerns.
Competition law – Merger control; Horizontal effects – geographic market for major regional retail centres; Vertical relationships and cross-shareholdings – foreclosure risk; Public interest – no adverse effects; Approval without conditions.
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12 October 2011 |
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Acquirer’s increase to majority shareholding did not substantially lessen competition; merger approved without conditions.
* Competition law – Merger approval – Large merger increasing majority shareholding – Assessment whether transaction substantially prevents or lessens competition. * Corporate governance – Cross‑directorship concerns and pre-existing control issues – not necessarily merger-specific. * Procedural/jurisdictional limits – Competition authority not a forum for private contractual timing disputes (pre-emptive rights). * Public interest – Employment impact considered and no adverse effect found.
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3 October 2011 |
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The Tribunal approved the applicant’s property‑portfolio acquisition, finding no substantial lessening of competition or public interest issues.
Competition law – merger control – property merger – market definition (Grade A office space, Sandton) – low post‑merger market share – many competitors and countervailing buyer power – no public interest concerns – unconditional approval.
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3 October 2011 |
| September 2011 |
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Tribunal conditionally approves small merger, imposing interoperability remedies to prevent technical foreclosure while allowing pro‑competitive integration.
Competition — Small merger — Potential technical foreclosure via interoperability/file‑format withdrawal — Appropriate behavioural remedy: continued provision of file formats (free) and APIs/SDKs (reasonable market terms) — Proportionality and duration (5 years).
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30 September 2011 |
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Tribunal approved a merger finding distinct markets with no substantial lessening of competition, and no public interest concerns.
Merger control – market definition – no product overlap between confectionery and baby‑diaper markets; no substantial lessening of competition; public interest (employment) considered and found not engaged; acquisition via subsidiary conferring sole control.
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28 September 2011 |
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Acquisition of a 50% share in a lettings enterprise approved as unlikely to substantially lessen competition.
Competition — Merger control — Property sector — Acquisition of 50% undivided share in a letting enterprise — Rentable light industrial space — Greater Germiston node — Low post‑merger market share (6.73%) — Single long‑term tenant — No substantial lessening of competition — No public interest concerns.
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28 September 2011 |
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A bank’s 45% acquisition of an IT distributor raised only minimal vertical concerns and was approved unconditionally.
Merger control — assessment of horizontal and vertical overlaps — IT equipment distribution vs banking services — minimal vertical integration (0.7% turnover) — financial brokering not equivalent to financing — no public interest concerns — merger approved without conditions.
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26 September 2011 |
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The Tribunal approved the merger, finding no competition or public interest concerns and no horizontal or vertical overlap.
* Competition law – merger approval – assessment of horizontal overlap and vertical integration; no overlap found.
* Public interest – no public interest concerns identified.
* Structure – acquisition of 49% shareholding with cession of loan claims; acquiring firm to obtain control.
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21 September 2011 |
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The Tribunal unconditionally approved an acquisition in the casino, hotel and leisure market, finding no competition or public interest concerns.
Competition law – merger control – casino gaming, leisure, hotel and resorts market – merger cleared unconditionally – no competition or public interest concerns identified.
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21 September 2011 |
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Tribunal unconditionally approved the merger, finding no substantial lessening of competition and no merger-related job losses.
Competition — Merger — change from joint to sole control; horizontal overlap in solar module production; modest domestic market share (~15%); future vertical integration via affiliate entry — no foreclosure; public interest — pre-merger voluntary retrenchments not merger-related; unconditional approval.
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21 September 2011 |
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Acquiring firm’s move from minority to sole control of a fruit marketer raises no competition or public interest concerns; merger approved.
Competition law – merger approval – acquisition of remaining share capital by existing minority shareholder – no horizontal overlap – no substantial lessening of competition – public interest (employment) not implicated – approved without conditions.
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21 September 2011 |
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A restructuring acquisition of an SVR business approved as unlikely to substantially lessen competition.
Merger control – market definition: stolen vehicle recovery, fleet monitoring and telematics; Competitive effects – non-merger-specific allegations of exclusivity; Foreclosure risk from minority shareholdings; Public interest – employment effects.
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12 September 2011 |
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The Tribunal approved a shelf-company acquisition of a mushroom producer, finding no substantial lessening of competition or public interest concerns.
Competition — Merger control — Acquisition by a shelf company controlled by financial group — No horizontal/vertical overlap with mushroom production/processing market — No substantial lessening of competition — No public interest/employment concerns.
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7 September 2011 |
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Applicant granted limited intervention to address vertical foreclosure, predatory pricing/bundling, prior implementation and remedies in merger review.
* Competition — Merger intervention — Leave to intervene in merger proceedings under section 12A(2) — Limited intervention scope to vertical foreclosure and predatory pricing/bundling theories of harm.
* Competition — Vertical integration — Potential foreclosure via control of coldset printing inputs to newspaper publishing markets.
* Competition — Pricing conduct — Allegations of predatory pricing and bundling as possible anti-competitive effects of a merger.
* Merger procedure — Prior implementation — Consideration of prior implementation limited to economic analysis and counterfactuals.
* Procedure — Rights of intervenor — Access to confidential record subject to undertakings, discovery, summons, evidence, cross-examination, and timetable constraints.
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7 September 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement resolving alleged price-fixing by industry tariff-setting, imposing penalty and compliance obligations.
Competition law — Section 4(1)(b)(i) — Price-fixing — Industry association jointly determining SAFEX daily storage tariff — Use of SAFEX tariff in physical market — Consent agreement — Administrative penalty — Compliance programme and cooperation obligations.
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7 September 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirmed consent agreement finding respondent’s limited participation in tariff-setting could constitute price-fixing, imposing penalty and compliance duties.
Competition Act s4(1)(b)(i) – horizontal price-fixing via industry association; industry associations and SAFEX tariffs; consent agreement under s58; administrative penalty under s59; cooperation obligations and competition law compliance programme.
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7 September 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal confirms consent agreement resolving alleged cartel price-fixing, imposing penalty and compliance obligations on the respondent.
* Competition law – Section 4(1)(b)(i) – horizontal price-fixing – standardised industry storage tariff – collective determination of prices. * Consent agreement – confirmation under section 58(1)(a)(iii) – settlement of cartel allegations. * Administrative penalty – section 59 – monetary sanction proportionate to turnover. * Remedial obligations – cooperation, testimony, evidence production, and mandatory competition law compliance programme.
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7 September 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal declines to dismiss referral: referral sufficiently particular and s67(1) prescription challenge premature.
* Competition law – referral competency – legality and intelligibility of Commission referrals under Rule 15 and pertinent case law (Woodlands, Loungefoam).
* Tribunal procedure – proceedings are sui generis; not strictly equivalent to High Court motion proceedings; remedies for insufficiency include particulars or amendment.
* Prescription – s67(1) creates a factual enquiry as to when prohibited conduct ceased; respondent bears initial factual burden to invoke time‑bar.
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7 September 2011 |
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Reported
Tribunal struck out defective referral for vagueness and lack of pleaded dominance; lacks power to order re-investigation or damages.
Competition law – complaint referrals – excipiable pleadings; failure to define relevant market or plead dominance – sections 7, 8, Rule 15(2); Tribunal’s remedial limits – section 58(1) (no power to refer back to Commission or award compensatory damages); locus standi to enforce consent orders; interdictory relief moot where conduct ceased.
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5 September 2011 |
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Acquisition granting negative control over an FMCG holding company poses no horizontal or vertical competition concerns and is approved unconditionally.
Mergers — horizontal non-overlap — no substantial lessening of competition; Mergers — vertical concerns — non-controlling interests and absence of foreclosure risk; Public interest — no adverse effects identified; Approval — unconditional.
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5 September 2011 |
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Crossing the bright-line share threshold without substantive control change did not create competition concerns in the international PGM market.
Competition — Merger approval — Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) market — Relevant product market: PGMs; geographic market: international — Crossing bright-line share threshold without substantive change of de facto control — Low post-merger market shares and presence of significant competitors — No substantial lessening of competition — No material public interest concerns.
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1 September 2011 |
| August 2011 |
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The applicant’s acquisition of a PGM mining right was approved as unlikely to substantially lessen competition internationally.
• Competition law – merger approval – acquisition of mining right for platinum group metals (PGMs) – relevant market international.• Merger assessment – future overlap where no current production – assessed on estimated future market share.• Market power – low prospective market share (circa 15%) and presence of significant competitors – unlikely substantial lessening of competition.• Public interest – no employment or other public interest concerns identified.
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31 August 2011 |
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The applicant was granted conditional leave to intervene in merger consideration proceedings with defined participatory and confidentiality rights.
* Competition law – Intervention – Applicant granted leave to intervene in Tribunal consideration of Competition Commission's conditional merger approval; * Participation rights – Scope defined under section 12A(3)(a) and (d) (evidence, cross‑examination, discovery, interlocutory participation); * Confidentiality – access to confidential record conditional on confidentiality undertakings; * Procedure – timetable for discovery, notice to raise section 12A(3)(c) issues, and compliance with pre-hearing directions.
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30 August 2011 |
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Tribunal compels respondent to produce specified documents unredacted by a set deadline in a discovery dispute.
* Competition law – discovery – Tribunal power to compel further and better discovery and to set compliance deadlines; confidentiality and redactions.
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24 August 2011 |
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The Tribunal granted applicants leave to intervene in a merger review over public‑interest concerns about seed access, OPVs, and barriers to entry.
Competition law – merger review – intervention by third parties under s53(1)(c)(v) – public interest considerations including seed pricing, availability of open-pollinated varieties, effects on smallholder and small-scale commercial black farmers, barriers to entry, and germplasm/public-good concerns – procedural directions and rights of interveners (evidence, cross-examination, access to confidential records).
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19 August 2011 |
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Tribunal provisionally suspended a merger divestiture condition pending review under section 16(2) of the Competition Act.
Competition law – merger approval – divestiture condition – provisional suspension of divestiture pending section 16(2) review; interim relief; entitlement to apply for extension of divestiture period.
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19 August 2011 |
