Mokoro Holding Company (Pty) Ltd and Others v COG Oil Proprietary (Pty) Ltd and Others (26535/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1280 (25 November 2022)

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

 

1. REPORTABLE: NO

2. OF INTEREST OF OTHER JUDGES: NO

3. REVISED

25/1/2022

 

DATE SIGNITURE

 

 

 

CASE NUMBER: 26535/2021

 

In the matter of

 

MOKORO HOLDING COMPANY (PTY) LTD FIRST APPLICANT

t/a BRIDGE TAXI FINANCE HOLDINGS

 

BRIDGE SERVICE PANEL (PTY) LTD SECOND APPLICANT

 

CAPITAL PROPFUND (PTY) LTD THIRD APPLICANT

 

JT ROSS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD FOUTH APPLICANT

 

And

 

 

COG OIL PROPRIETARY (PTY) LTD FIRST RESPONDENT

 

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG SECOND RESWPONDENT

METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

 

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG PROPERTY THIRD RESPONDENT

COMPANY SOC LIMITED

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL CSP AJ:

 

Introduction

[1] This is an application for a final interdict in which the applicants seeks an order interdicting the first respondent from using any portion of the public road comprising of the cul-de-sac of Tungsten, Strijdompark, Johannesburg for any purpose other than a public road as contemplated in the Consolidated Johannesburg Town Planning Scheme for so long as the cul-de-sac is zoned as a public road.

 

[2] The final interdict is aimed at preventing the first respondent from using the cul-de-sac at the end of Tungsten Road in Strijdompark in accordance with the written lease agreement concluded by it with the second and third respondents on 24 October 2019.

 

Parties

[3] The first applicant is Mokoro Holding Company (PTY) Ltd t/a Bridge Taxi Finance Holdings, a private company registered and incorporated in South Africa.

 

[4] The second applicant is Bridge Service and Panel (PTY) Ltd, a private company registered and incorporated in South Africa. Bridge is in occupation of Erf 432 and Erf 329. Each of these erven are used by Bridge in carrying on its business, pursuant to lease agreements concluded with Capital and JT Ross.

 

[5] The third applicant is Capital Propfund (PTY) Ltd, a private company registered and incorporated in South Africa. Capital is the registered owner of the property known as Erf 432 (previously erven 426 and 427) Hans Strijdom Drive and Tungsten Street, Strijdom Park.

 

[6] The fourth applicant is JT Ross Properties (PTY) LTD, a private company registered and incorporated in South Africa. JT Ross is the registered owner of the property known as Erf 329 Strijdompark, which is the vacant land at 329 Tungsten Street, Strijdom Park.

 

[7] The first respondent is COG Oil Proprietary Limited (“COG”), a private company registered and incorporated in South Africa. COG carries on business at 75 Wakis Avenue, Strijdompark, Randburg, the rear of which property borders Tungsten Street, Strijdompark.

 

[8] The second respondent is the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (“the City”), a local municipality as contemplated in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 and the Local Government Municipal Structures Act,117 of 1998, as amended and published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 141 of 1 October 2000, as amended by Notice 8698/2000 published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 195 of 4 December 2000.

 

[9] The third respondent is the City of Johannesburg Property Company SOC Limited (“JPC”), a public company registered and incorporated in South Africa.

 

[10] The second and third respondents are cited in this application on account of their interest in the outcome of this application and, particularly, the review that the applicants are launching in respect of the decision taken by the City, alternatively, by JPC, to enter into a lease agreement with COG for the cul-de-sac at the end of Tungsten Street, Randburg, which the second applicant uses in the course of carrying on its business.

 

Background of relevant facts

[11] For purposes of the application it is important to note that Erf 432 and Erf 329, occupied by the second applicant are adjoining erven in the cul-de-sac at the end of Tungsten Road. Erf 432 is an office park where the second applicant has its workshop. The second applicant utilizes the cul-de-sac via a gate on Erf 432 in order to enter and exit Erf 329 which it uses as a storage yard.

 

[12] During 2014 Dr Wright, the Group Operations Officer of the first respondent, COG approached the second and third respondents to purchase or lease the cul-de-sac in order to facilitate the expansion of the business of the Clive Teubes Group of Companies1, of which COG is the property-owning company.

 

[13] The process took five years until finalization. During the period the intended use of the cul-de-sac was advertised by the relevant parties, and no objections were received to the enclosure of the cul-de-sac.2

 

[14] The third applicant purchased the building on erf 432 on 26 July 2016. During December 2019 the property was leased by the third applicant to the first and second applicants. This was after the intended use of the cul-de-sac had been advertised to neighbours in the area and no objections were lodge against the intended closure of the cul-de-sac.

 

[15] The business of the first and second applicants concerns the repair of broken-down minibus taxis, and therefore the cul-de-sac is used to store the broken-down minibus taxis awaiting repair.

 

[16] On 24 October 2019 the first respondent, COG entered into a written lease agreement (the lease”) with the second respondent in respect of the cul-de-sac. In terms of the lease the property leased and hired is the cul-de-sac. The lease period will be for nine years and eleven months commencing on 1 November 2019. The termination date of the lease will be 30 September 2030. In terms of the lease the cul-de-sac is leased for storage purposes.

[17] During June 2020 the first and second applicants were informed of the existence of the lease, and as such were aware of the first respondent’s intention to enclosed the cul-de-sac.

 

[18] The first respondent requested the first and second applicants to remove the broken-down minibus taxis from the cul-de-sac in order for the first respondent to enclose the cul-de-sac in line with the lease. Due to concerns raised by the applicants, correspondence and meetings3 followed between the parties involved in order to resolve the issues between them in an amicable manner.

 

[19] On 27 October 2020 the second and third respondent replied to a request in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) and informed the applicants that the decision to lease the cul-de-sac to the first respondent had been taken in terms of the following legislation;

1. section 14(2) of the Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 56 of 20034 read with,

2. Regulation 34(1)(b) of the Municipal Asset Transfer Regulations5, and

3. the provisions of sections 66 and 79(18) of the Local Government Ordinance 19396. (referred to as the Applicable Law.)

 

[20] The applicants were informed that the second and third respondents authorised the conclusion of the lease and the “temporary closure” of the cul-de-sac.

 

[21] Due to the irreconcilable differences between the parties the situation could not be resolved and on 20 October 2021 the applicants launched an urgent application for an interim interdict ordering the first respondent to refrain from enclosing the cul-de-sac. Opperman J dismissed the application on the basis of lack of urgency.

 

[22] Consequently the applicants delivered an amended notice of motion in terms wherein the scope of this application has been limited to a final interdict against the use of the cul-de-sac for purposes not permitted in law.

 

[23] Furthermore, on 20 October 2021 the applicants served a judicial review application on the first respondent.

 

Submissions by the applicant

[24] Counsil for the applicants argued that the conclusion of the lease agreement between the first, second and third respondents is invalid because the lease prevents the applicants and the general public from transversing the cul-de-sac, a public road.

 

[25] It was argued that the proposition by the first respondent that the lease agreement changed the identity and zoning of the cul-de-sac lacks in any basis of law. The reasons for the argument are the following;

1. Every piece of land within the area of jurisdiction of a local authority, such as the City, is zoned for a particular use;

2. The zoning, or the use rights, is prescribed by the Land Use Scheme in terms of which the uses to which the land may be put is prescribed;

3. The Land Use Scheme also prescribes the uses to which the land may be put with the consent of the City and the uses for which the land may never be used; and

4. There is a statutorily prescribed process in terms of which use rights may be changed.

 

[26] Therefore, the applicants argued that the zoning and primary use rights of the cul-de-sac are not capable of being changed simply by the conclusion of a contract between the City or owner and a third party, because there is a process prescribed by the City’s Municipal Planning By-Law of 2016 7 which regulates the change of use rights.

 

[27] The applicants further avers that the By-Laws8, the Scheme 9 and the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 201310 (“SPLUMA”) impose a criminal sanction for the contravention of the Scheme and as such imposing a binding obligation on land owners and users to use land for the purposes permitted.

 

[28] In circumstances where an owner or land users fail to comply with legislation, an interdict against the unlawful use must follow, and therefore, the Court has no power nor a discretion to refuse an interdict once it is established that the conduct of which an applicant complains is, an offence. The principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of Lester.11

[29] The applicants contended that the principles in the Lester case apply with equal effect to this matter, and therefore the legal principles applicable to the use of land contained in the Land Use Scheme have to be adhered to. Counsil for the applicants argued that the first respondents intended unlawful conduct of the cul-de-sac, a public road, must be interdicted.

 

[30] The applicants argued that they have the right to a final interdict as they have demonstrated that the intended use of the cul-de-sac for storage purposes is in contravention of the Scheme and is an offence. Counsil for the applicants contended that in such circumstances a final interdict must be granted which was clearly stated in the Chapman’s Peak Hotel case12 where the following was stated;

“Once it is accepted that the nature of the right in question is a public right, then it must follow, in my view, that for continuing infringements of the right the only effective remedy is an interdict.”

 

Submissions by the respondent

[31] The first respondent argued that whether or not the second respondent’s decision to close the cul-de-sac was lawful is not the subject matter of the applicants’ case. The reason for the averment is because the decision to close the cul-de-sac and to lease the space to the first respondent to use for purposes of storage, constituted an administrative action within the meaning of PAJA.

 

[32] It was furthermore contended by the first respondent the applicants’ instituted a review application on 20 October 2021, weeks before the hearing. The reason in stating the review was to set aside the decision by the second and third respondent, which is an objective fact. Council for the first respondent argued that this application for a final interdict is an attempt to circumvent the time-barring of the review application and to achieve indirectly what the applicants’ cannot achieve directly.

 

[33] The first respondent avers that the law is squarely against the applicants’ attempt to negate the administrative decisions of the second and third respondent without taking any steps to review and set aside the decisions in terms of PAJA.

 

[34] Counsil for the first respondent further argued that the applicants’ are in breach of the “clean hands-doctrine”. The applicants oppose the first respondent’s right to use the cul-de-sac for storage purposes as it is expressly recorded in the lease, and they do so on the basis that the public has a right to access the cul-de-sac, being a public road.

 

[35] However, the applicants motive is not altruistic, and they do not seek to benefit the public at large, instead, they seek to protect their own use of the cul-de-sac as a place to store broken down minibus taxis awaiting repair at the workshop.

 

[36] Therefore, it is contended on the same arguments by the applicants, should apply to their unlawful use of the cul-de-sac and thus should also be precluded by SPLUMA. Therefore, it was argued that the applicants’ own argument, if accepted, defeats the relief sought by the applicants.

 

[37] The first respondent argued that the applicants have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or the absence of an alternative remedy in order for a final interdict to be granted, and therefore the application must be dismissed.

 

[38] Counsil for the first respondent avers that the applicants seek to demonstrate their “clear right” to the final interdictory relief on the basis of SPLUMA and its application on the matter. According to the first respondent the argument based on SPLUMA is fundamentally flawed, because the cul-de-sac was closed and the lease was concluded with the first respondent in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 56 of 2003 (“MFMA”), the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939 (“the Ordinance”) and the Municipal Asset Transfer Regulations of 2008. (Applicable Law)

 

[39] This argument is based on section 66 of Ordinance which deals with the “closing of certain public places” and sub-section (1)(b) states;

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Ordinance, a council may, after having given such notice as it may deem necessary, close any street, road or thoroughfare vested in the council-

(i) permanently or temporarily for any particular class of traffic, procession or gathering;

(ii) temporarily for all traffic…”

 

[40] Therefore, the first respondent contended that the power of the second respondent to close the cul-de-sac for the duration of the lease is clearly provided for in the Ordinance. The second respondent exercised its power to close the cul-de-sac and thus the public no longer had right of way to the cul-de-sac. The public’s right of way is the fundamental premise on which the applicants base their case for a “clear right” and therefore in the absence of the public’s right of way the case must fail.

 

[41] The first respondent contended that the second respondent complied with section 79(18) of the Ordinance which states that a municipal council may lease any immovable property of the council, provided that the council causes a resolution to that effect to be affixed to the public notice board of the council and published in one newspaper, which was done.

 

[42] It also complied with section 14(2) of the MFMA which states that a municipality may dispose of a capital asset provided that the council, in a meeting open to the public, decides that the asset, is not needed to provide the minimum level of basis municipal service. Furthermore, it also has to consider the fair market value of the asset and the economic and community value to be received in exchange for the asset.

 

[43] The argument raised by the first respondent is that the Asset Transfer Regulations in regulation 34(1)(b) provides that a municipality may grant the use, control or manage a capital asset if the council has approved, in principle, that right may be granted, which right in the matter was granted by a written lease agreement.

 

[44] As stated in the above arguments the first respondent argued that the applicants failed to take into account the provisions of the Applicable Legislation and they failed to demonstrate that the provisions of SPLUMA override and negate the provisions of the Applicable Law.

 

[45] The argument by the applicants that the closure of a public road can only be effected by a re-zoning is flawed. It was argued that a formal statutory re-zoning process is unsustainable because the decision to close the cul-de-sac were done in accordance with Applicable Law.

 

[46] Therefore, the argument should fail and the application for a final interdict should be dismissed with costs.

 

[47] The first respondent in the alternative argued that if it is found that SPLUMA does apply to the facts of the case, the application should still fail because the applicants have elected to pursue a final interdict instead of an application in terms of the Uniform Rule 53 to review and set aside the administrative decision of the second and third respondent in terms of PAJA.

 

Common cause facts

[48] The following facts are common cause:

1. The cul-de-sac at the end of Tungsten Street, Strijdompark is a public road,

2. On 25 October 2019 the first respondent entered into a written lease agreement with the second respondent,

3. The terms of the lease agreement are common cause;

4. The lease agreement permits the use of the cul-de-sac for the use of storage, subject to the terms of the lease agreement and prohibits any contravention of “..any town planning scheme applicable to the property…”;

5. The cul-de-sac has not been re-zoned from that of a “public road”;

6. On 24 May 2021 the applicants were informed by the first respondent of its intention to fence off the cul-de-sac, which was to be done on 1 July 2021.

 

Disputed Facts

[49] Whether the applicants proofed the requirements for the relief sought, namely a final interdict.

 

Case law and evaluation

[50] The decision to close the cul-de-sac to the public and the lease of the cul-de-sac to the first respondent for purposes of storage, lies at the heart of the applicants’ prayer for a final interdict, which is premised on the fact that the cul-de-sac is a public road.

 

[51] The requirements for a final interdict are:13

1. a clear right on part of the applicant;

2. and injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and

3. no other satisfactory remedy available to the applicant.

 

[52] In order to establish that the right in question is a clear right the Court has to find that the following exits:

1. confirming that the right exits in law, and

2. proving that the right exists in fact.

 

[53] Whether an applicant has a right is a matter of substantive law, and therefore the right must be recognized by law. The applicants argued that their right for a final interdict to be granted is founded on the fact that the cul-de-sac is a public road, which is zoned in terms of SPLUMA. This contention is indeed not in dispute. However, a written lease agreement was concluded between the first and second respondents, which stipulates that the cul-de-sac was to be closed for public access and be used for purposed of storage by the first respondent.

 

[54] Rights are also created by contract, and in this instance the first respondents’ right of occupation of the cul-de-sac is created under the written lease agreement. The existence of the lease is an objective fact. Whether the lease is valid or invalid is not the question to be decided by this Court. It is important not to muddy the water when deciding on granting or dismissing the relief sought by the applicants. The lease stands until set aside in a review process as contemplated in Uniform Rule 53

 

[55] Furthermore, whether the correct procedures were followed by the second and third respondents in procuring the lease is a matter to be decided in a judicial review application. It is evident to note that such proceedings was instituted by the applicant on 20 October 2021, two weeks prior to this hearing.

 

[56] The Oudekraal principle is of importance in the matter. In the Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others14 the Supreme Court of Appeal developed the principle that an unlawful act may produce legally recognisable consequences.

 

[57] The following was said in the Oudekraal case;

“[26] For those reasons it is clear, in our view, that the Administrator’s permission was unlawful and invalid at the outset…But the question that arises is what consequences follow from the conclusion that the Administrator acted unlawfully. Is the permission that was granted by the Administrator simply to be disregarded as if it had never existed? In other words, was the Cape Metropolitan Council entitled to disregard the Administrator’s approval and all its consequences merely because it believed that they were invalid provided that its belief was correct? In our view, it was not. Until the Administrator’s approval (and thus also the consequences of the approval) is set aside by a court in proceedings for judicial review it exists in fact and it has legal consequences that cannot simply be overlooked. The proper functioning of a modern State would be considerably compromised if all administrative acts could be given effect to or ignored depending upon the view the subject takes of the validity of the act in question. No doubt it is for this reason that our law has always recognised that even an unlawful administrative act is capable of producing legally valid consequences for so long as the unlawful act is not set aside.”

 

[58] I am therefore of the view that the decision of the second and third respondents to close the cul-de-sac and to conclude the lease with the first respondent, even if unlawful, has legal consequences, until set aside. Therefore, the applicants did not succeed in proving a clear right as required for the relief sought.

 

[59] When deciding on the second requirement for the granting of the relief sought by the applicant, namely, an injury actually committed or reasonable apprehended, the applicant must proof some act by the respondents interfered with the applicants’ rights, or that it have a well-grounded apprehension that acts of the kind will be committed by the respondents.

 

[60] It is common cause that the first respondent approached the applicants on several occasions in order to discuss an amicable solution regarding the fencing of the cul-de-sac. It is not disputed that the applicants utilize the cul-de-sac for delivery and at times for storage of broken down minibus taxis, whereafter the minibus taxis are being stored in the yard until moved to the workshop.

 

[61] The contention made by the applicants regarding injury is that due to the closure of the cul-de-sac it will be unable to off load the broken down minibus taxis and that will prejudice their business. It is common cause that he first respondent, on the other hand, is prepared to create a pathway in the fenced area in order for the applicants to proceed with their business.

 

[62] If the intention of the applicants are to safe guard the longevity of their business, I am unable to comprehend such a averment of injury. If the first respondent grant the applicants a pathway in the cul-de-sac to proceed with their business, in which case the applicants will suffer no injury. The applicants in such circumstances will be required to clear the cul-de-sac of the broken down minibus taxis after being off loaded to its storage yard. Which seems to be problematic seeing that the minibus taxis are being stored in the cul-de-sac.

 

[63] Furthermore, an interdict can only be granted to protect a legitimate right. The “clean hands” principle discourages illegality, because it will be contrary to public policy to render assistance to those defying the law.15 The first respondents’ right in fencing off the cul-de-sac is founded in a lease, whether valid or not. The first respondent is prepared even though a lease exists, to assist the applicants to continue with their business as before.

 

[64] I am of the view that the applicants intention to sought the relief requested is purely to use the cul-de-sac for storage purposes and as alleged not to grant the general public access via the cul-de-sac. This fact is confirmed by the photographs of the applicants’ usage of the cul-de-sac disclosed during the application by the first respondent. Thus, the applicants approached the Court with an ulterior motive which is to obtain an interdict in restraining the first respondent to utilize its rights in terms of the lease.

 

[65] The last requirement for a final interdict is that the applicant must have no ordinary or satisfactory remedy, other than an interdict to protect its rights. An interdict is a drastic remedy, and the Court will not grant an interdict when some other satisfactory form of redress would be adequate or would provide protection.16

 

[66] The applicants must allege and establish, on a balance of probabilities, that it has no alternative legal remedy available. It is important to note that an alternative remedy can be almost any legal remedy available.

 

[67] Section 32 of the Constitution17 deals with the right of access to information and it provides everyone has the right of access to any information that is held by the State or by another person that is required for the protection of any rights.

 

[68] In terms of PAJA public and private bodies are held accountable to society for its actions and decisions.

 

[69] Section 32 of the Constitution together with PAJA forms a new approach, aimed at ensuring more effective and efficient administrative processes.

 

[70] In terms of PAJA section 1 provides that, “administrative action, means any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, by-

(a) an organ of state, when-

(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution;

(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any

legislation; or

(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public

power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision,

which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect, but does not include...”

 

[71] The decision of the second and third respondents to close the cul-de-sac and to lease it to the first respondent meets the requirements of administrative action within the meaning of PAJA. This administrative decision can be reviewed in terms of Uniform Rule 53.

 

[72] If a final interdict is granted, such relief will render the administrative decision taken by the second and third respondent invalid and unenforceable. The effect thereof will be that the lease concluded, will be unenforceable, even though it exists as a matter of fact. This will result that the applicants will, in an indirect way, deprive the administrative decision taken by the second and third respondents of their force and effect. This will be done without attacking (reviewing) the validity of the administrative action which resulted in the conclusion of the lease agreement.

 

[73] One has to keep in mind that the second and third respondents have not participated in the application before me, and I agree with the contention of the first respondent in that their non-participation can be due to the indirect manner in which the applicants seek to attack their administrative decision relating to the closure of the cul-de-sac and the lease of the property. Furthermore, it is evident that no relief is sought against the second and third respondents which may also be the reason why they did not participate in the application.

 

[74] I am of the view that the applicants can obtain the relief they sought by way of judicial review proceedings, where the administrative decision by the second and third respondents can be set aside, if a court find that the administrative process was not followed in the closing of the cul-de-sac and the conclusion of the lease. It is evident that the applicants have seemingly sought to circumvent the provisions of PAJA and judicial review processes.

 

[75] In the circumstances, the applicants have not proved the requirements set out in order to obtain a final interdict. The applicant did not prove that they have a clear right, that they will suffer injury or that injury is reasonable apprehended if an interdict is not granted. Lastly I find that an alternative remedy does exsist, namely judicial review in terms Uniform Rule 53.

 

Costs

[76] The general rule pertaining to costs is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to reimburse the successful party for the costs that has been incurred as a result of litigation.

[77] An award of attorney and client costs is not lightly granted by the court:18 The court leans against awarding attorney and client costs,19 and will grant such costs only on “rare” occasions.20

[78] It is clear that normally the court does not order a litigant to pay the costs of another litigant on the basis of attorney and client unless some special grounds are present.21 An award of attorney and client costs is granted by reason of some special considerations arising either from the circumstances which gave rise to the action, or from the conduct of the losing party. The list is not exhaustive.

[79] In Van Wyk v Millington22 it was pointed out that the court’s reluctance to award attorney and client costs against a party is based on the right of every person to bring his complaints or his alleged wrongs before the court to get a decision, and he should not be penalised if he is misguided in bringing a hopeless case before the court. If, however, the court is satisfied that there is an absence of bona fides in bringing or defending an action it will not hesitate to award attorney and client costs.

[80] The first respondent has been successful in the outcome of the application and therefore is entitled to a cost order. However in awarding cost on attorney and client scale, the court has to find that there is “some special ground” present, which justifies a punitive cost order. In the circumstance before me I cannot find any “special ground” present which justifies a punitive cost order.

 

Order

[81] In the premises I make the following order:

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicants to pay the costs which include the cost of two counsel on party and party scale, jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved

 

 

 

 

 

______________________

 

CSP OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

 

 

 

Date of hearing: 02 November 2021

Date of judgment: 25 November 2022

 

Appearances:

 

Counsel for Applicant: Adv A W Pullinger and

Adv A Darby

 

Instructed by: Oosthuizen du Toit Berg and Boon

Office No: (011) 883-9041

Email: charl@odbb.co.za

Counsel for 1st Respondent: Adv C J Mc Aslin SC and

Adv T Govender

 

Instructed by: John Issabelle Attorneys

Office No: (011) 326-41263

Email: john@isabelle.co.za;

mitchell@isabelle.co.za