CASE NO: 424/93
N v H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
ATLANTIS DIESEL ENGINES (PTY) LTD
and
NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS OF SOUTH AFRICA
SMALBERGER, JA
CASE NO: 424/93 N v H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
ATLANTIS DIESEL ENGINES (Pty) LTD Appellant
and
NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS
OF SOUTH AFRICA Respondent
CORAM: HOEXTER, SMALBERGER, KUMLEBEN,
NIENABER et HOWIE, JJA
HEARD: 14 November 1994 DELIVERED: 30 November 1994
JUDGMENT
SMALBERGER, JA:-
The appellant ("the company") is a manufacturer of diesel
2 engines and components. In March 1991 it retrenched a number of
its hourly-paid employees. Most of them were members of the
respondent ("NUMSA"). Consequent thereon NUMSA sought an
order in the Industrial Court, in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour
Relations Act 28 of 1956 ("the Act"), that the retrenchment
constituted an unfair labour practice. Relief was sought on behalf
of the affected employees in the form of reinstatement, alternatively,
compensation. The Industrial Court held that no unfair labour
practice had been committed and dismissed the application. Its
judgment is reported at (1992) 13 ILJ 405 ("the IC judgment").
NUMSA, in terms of s 17(21A)(a) of the Act, appealed
against this decision to the Labour Appeal Court ("the LAC"). It
upheld the appeal, set aside the Industrial Court's determination and
substituted a determination in favour of NUMSA that the company
had committed an unfair labour practice. The LAC made no
specific order of reinstatement or compensation but came to the
following decision (at p 654 H-I):
3
"It appears to this court to be a wiser course to leave the details of reinstatement (if at all) and/or compensation (if any) to be discussed and negotiated between the appellant union and the respondent company. Should they fail to reach agreement, they may submit the matter to arbitration or approach this court for a decision upon presentation of the relevant evidence."
The judgment of the LAC is reported at (1993) 14 ILJ 642 ("the LAC judgment"). The company, having obtained the required leave, now appeals against that court's findings and determination. The essential facts of the matter are not in dispute. They are set out in the main in the LAC judgment at 644I-646I. No point would be served by repeating them in detail. It will suffice to highlight the following:
1) In 1990 the company found itself in serious financial difficulties. The market for its products was declining and its operational capacity was substantially in excess of its needs. It had considered retrenchment - and had consulted with NUMSA in this regard - but was able to avoid that course
4 largely because of resignations and by redeployment of
personnel.
In January 1991 the company notified its employees that its financial plight persisted and that it was considering "downsizing" itself. It further informed them that a cost analysis group, comprising senior members of management and representatives of shareholders, had been appointed to consider the company's organizational structure and "to analyse all cost-relevant factors". The group in due course reported in writing its finding to the company ("the CAG report").
A consultative process was set in motion involving the company, NUMSA and certain other unions representing elements of the overall workforce ("the other unions"). To this end a series of five meetings was held in February and March 1991.
4) In the course of these meetings the company furnished
5 NUMSA and the other unions with certain details relevant to
its financial position and the retrenchment issue. Certain
proposals were tabled. At the third of these meetings (held
on 15 March 1991) NUMSA requested management to
furnish it with the full CAG report to enable it to make
helpful proposals with regard to retrenchment. The
company's response was that the report was confidential; that
its essence had already been communicated to NUMSA; and
that disclosure of the full report could prejudice both its
business and that of its suppliers.
5) NUMSA did not persist in its demand for the full report at
the fourth meeting. At the fifth and final meeting (held on 20
March 1991) NUMSA resurrected its demand for the full
CAG report when invited to put forward further proposals to
avoid retrenchment. The company declined to do so in the
absence of a specific undertaking by NUMSA to preserve the
report's confidentiality (citing certain recent leakages to the
6 press). It nevertheless undertook to provide certain
confidential information in general terms, which it proceeded
to do. As NUMSA was unable to put forward any
alternative proposals concerning retrenchment, the company
gave notice that retrenchment would ensue forthwith.
The unfair labour practice definition in the Act at the
operative time read (to the extent that it is relevant):
" 'unfair labour practice' means any act or omission which in an unfair manner infringes or impairs the labour relations between an employer and an employee, and shall include the following:
(a)
(b) the termination of the employment of an employee on
grounds other than disciplinary action, unless -
(0
(H) (aa)
(bb) prior consultation in regard to such termination of employment took place with either such employee or where the employee is represented by a trade union or body recognised by the employer as representing the employees or any group of them with such trade union, body or
7
group;
(cc)
(dd) "
The central issue in the appeal is in my view correctly
identified in the LAC judgment at 646I as follows:
"[T]he essence of the dispute concerns the question whether or not there was proper prior consultation by the company with the union [NUMSA] in respect of the retrenchment. The union alleged that the company had failed to consult properly because of its refusal to disclose to the union the full content of the CAG report."
As far as the CAG report is concerned, the LAC judgment also
correctly records (at 647A) that:
"The full report was disclosed only a few days before the hearing. It consists of a department by department analysis of the company's position, and recommends certain corrective actions, including reduction of staff spread over a two-year period."
In its judgment the LAC (at 65IE) referred to the Industrial Court's finding that the CAG report contained sensitive and confidential information which, if disclosed, could prejudice the
8 company's business. It went on to hold (at 653H-I) that
"without deciding whether the relevant information was indeed confidential or not, it is clear from a perusal of the report that the company could have blocked out those details which it sought to keep secret without disturbing the broader import of the report."
It finally concluded (at 654C-D):
"In the circumstances we find that there was a duty on the company to make the relevant portions of the report available to the appellant [NUMSA], either in full or in condensed form but without exclusion of relevant facts and details. Its failure to do so means that it had failed to consult properly with the appellant and had therefore committed an unfair labour practice."
The unfair labour practice definition casts upon an employer a duty of prior consultation with its employees (or their representative union or unions) before termination of their employment on non-disciplinary grounds. This raises issues of broader principle : when does such duty arise; what is the extent thereof; and what is the proper procedure to be followed by employers, and the concomitant rights of employees, in relation to
9 the issue of retrenchment? That a lack of accord exists in relation
to these matters in the decisions of the Industrial and Labour Appeal
Courts appears from the judgment of THRING, J in Chemical
Workers Industrial Union and Others v Sopelog CC (1994) 15 ILJ
90(LAC) at 100I to 103C. No useful purpose would be served in
stating and analysing the different points of view expressed in these
decisions. They reflect, broadly speaking, two opposing
approaches. The first finds general recognition and acceptance in
the IC judgment at 407G-409B; it tends to negate the need to
consult as a necessary prerequisite to a decision at managerial level
to retrench. The second finds expression in the LAC judgment at
649C-650C. The latter approach requires consultation once the
possible need for retrenchment is identified and before a final
decision to retrench is reached. It proceeds on the premise that
consultation requires more than merely affording an employee an
opportunity to comment or express an opinion on a decision already
made. It envisages a final decision being taken by management
10 only after there has been consultation in good faith.
I agree with what I have referred to as the second approach.
It seems to me that the duty to consult arises, as a general rule, both
in logic and in law, when an employer, having foreseen the need for
it, contemplates retrenchment. This stage would normally be
preceded by a perception or recognition by management that its
business enterprise is ailing or failing; a consideration of the causes
and possible remedies; an appreciation of the need to take remedial
steps; and the identification of retrenchment as a possible remedial
measure. Once that stage has been reached, consultation with
employees or their union representatives becomes an integral part
of the process leading to the final decision on whether or not
retrenchment is unavoidable. Consultation provides an
opportunity, inter alia, to explain the reasons for the proposed
retrenchment, to hear representations on possible ways and means
of avoiding retrenchment (or softening its effect) and to discuss and
consider alternative measures. It does not require an employer to
11
bargain with its workers or their unions with regard to retrenchment. Furthermore, the ultimate decision to retrench is one which falls squarely within the competence and responsibility of management. The need to consult before a final decision on retrenchment is taken has its rationale both in pragmatism and in principle (cf. South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991(4) SA 1(A) at 13 B-C). It is rooted in pragmatism because the main objective must be to avoid retrenchments altogether, alternatively, to reduce the number of dismissals and mitigate their consequences. Consultation provides employees or their union(s) with a fair opportunity to make meaningful and effective proposals relating to the need for retrenchment or, if such need is accepted, the extent and implementation of the retrenchment process. It satisfies principle because it gives effect to the desire of employees who may be affected to be heard, and helps serve the underlying policy of the Act - to avoid or at least minimize industrial conflict. Where retrenchment looms employees face the daunting prospect of losing
12 their employment through no fault of their own. This can have
about serious consequences and threaten industrial peace. Proper
consultation minimizes resentment and promotes greater harmony
in the workplace.
Counsel for the company and NUMSA respectively were
essentially in agreement as to the existence of a duty to consult and
the stage at which it arises, as outlined above. They were not ad
idem with regard to what the duty comprehends. Mr Gauntlett, for
the company, contended that an employer's duty extended no further
than:
to consult in good faith at the appropriate time;
to make, to the extent that circumstances permit, a sufficiently full disclosure of relevant information to the affected employees (or their union(s)) to enable the consultative process to take place fairly; and
to allow them an adequate opportunity to be heard, the extent of such opportunity being dependent upon the facts of each particular case.
13
Mr Tip, for NUMSA, accepted the correctness of (a) and (b).
As far as (c) is concerned, he contended that the employer's duty extended beyond merely providing the affected employees with an adequate opportunity of being heard. He argued that the endeavour to avoid retrenchment, or minimize its consequences, should amount to a joint problem-solving exercise with the parties striving for consensus where possible. I agree that consultation, if circumstances permit, should be geared to achieve that purpose (bearing in mind that problem-solving is something distinct from bargaining and that the final decision, where consensus cannot be achieved, always remains that of management). Such a course would best serve the objectives of the Act and be conducive to industrial peace.
The approach approved above is the one that should be followed as a general rule in a matter such as the present in order to achieve the required degree of fairness necessary to avoid falling foul of the unfair labour practice definition. It must be
14 emphasized, however, that whether an employer has, in a
retrenchment matter, complied with the duty of prior consultation
will inevitably depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each individual case. The scope and extent of consultation may be
attenuated in certain circumstances because of eg considerations of
urgency or confidentiality or some equally compelling reason (cf.
Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Zenzile and Others 1991(1)
SA 21(A) at 40 C-E). I further agree with what was said in the
LAC judgment at 652C that
"[a]n employer cannot be expected to disclose information which (a) is not available to it; (b) is not relevant to the issues under discussion; and (c) could harm the employer's business interest for reasons other than its relevance to the consultation process, eg trade secrets and other confidential information".
I come now to what is the crux of the present appeal. Did proper consultation with NUMSA take place concerning retrenchment having regard to the relevant facts, and the principles enunciated above? If not, the company would have failed in its
15 duty to consult and would have been guilty of an unfair labour
practice. The answer to the question posed lies in whether the
company disclosed to NUMSA whatever information it could
reasonably have been expected to reveal so that effective
consultation could take place. In this respect the CAG report
assumed cardinal importance because the whole retrenchment
process revolved around it.
The evidence establishes that there had always existed a good
and harmonious working relationship between the company, its
employees and their representative unions (including NUMSA).
This is exemplified by the fact that even on appeal, in seeking to
preserve that relationship, neither party has sought costs against the
other. There was accordingly no valid reason for the employees (or
NUMSA) to distrust the company or suspect its motives. Mr Tip
conceded that the company had a legitimate interest in seeking to
protect the confidential content of the CAG report, and that its
refusal to disclose the whole report was not due to a lack of good
16
faith on its part. It was not contended on appeal, in my view
rightly, that the company had consulted in bad faith, despite certain
misgivings expressed in the LAC judgment at 653A and whatever
contrary (but erroneous) perception NUMSA might have had at the
time. The only issue therefore is whether the company acted
unreasonably and, accordingly, unfairly.
That the CAG report contained confidential information
prejudicial to the company's business interests was not seriously
contested. In this regard Mr Greyling, the company's commercial
director, testified as follows:
"Kan u net weer vir ons verduidelik wat was die vertroulikheid wat u na verwys het in Januarie/Februarie 1991. Was daar oënskynlik sensitiwiteit om inligting openbaar te maak aan die Vakunie? Wat sou dit wees?
Die verslag soos ons horn aan u voorgele het bevat sekere inligting wat op die datum van uitreiking daarvan, middel Februarie, baie vertroulik van aard was. Onder andere daarin is daar aanduidings van die soort van prysverlaging wat ons op komponente vlak met plaaslike leweransiers sou beding het. Daar is 65 van hierdie
17
ondememings wat komponente aan ons lewer en met elkeen van daardie 65 mense moes ons om die tafel gaan sit en ons probleem aan hulle verduidelik en 'n betere prys nit hulle nit beding. Daar was geen manier dat ons kon toelaat dat hierdie soort van inligting algemene kennis word nie.
Daar is ook aanduidings in daardie verslag van die omvang van pryskonsessies wat ons aan die Engelse of wat ons van PERKINS sou beding. Die ander lisensiehouer.
: Ja.
: Weer eens, dit sou ons - ons saak benadeel net indien daardie soort van inligting algemene kennis sou geword het. Die groep het hulle ondersoek afgehandel aan die einde van - einde van Februarie. Daar is eintlik nie baie tyd gewees om hierdie strategic alles in plek te stel nie.
: Waarom sou dit u benadeel, kom ons begin maar by die plaaslike verskaffers, waarom sou dit u benadeel om prysverlagings deur plaaslike verskaffers algemene kennis te maak?
: Jy ontneem jouself van 'n geleentheid om te beding en te onderhandel indien die persoon wat jy nader alreeds vooraf kennis het van wat jy wil hê by horn."
In the light of Greyling's evidence the company was entitled
18 (in the absence of reasonable safeguards) to refuse to divulge the
full contents of the report. Mr Tip conceded as much. Its attitude
in that regard cannot be labelled improper, unreasonable or
inherently unfair.
In its judgment the LAC held (at 653F) that there "can be no
doubt about the relevance of the CAG report and the instrumental
role which it played in the decision to retrench a number of the
appellant's [NUMSA's] members". It then went on to list various
matters covered in the report which pertained in some way to the
decision to retrench (at 653G). It declined to make any finding as
to whether what it termed "the relevant information" in the CAG
report, was confidential. It simply held, as previously mentioned,
"that the company could have blocked out those details which it
sought to keep secret without disturbing the broader import of the
report". It did not attempt to define what those details were, nor
did it consider how their omission from the report by blocking them
out would have impacted upon it and whether the report, thus
19
modified and abridged, would have been acceptable to NUMSA.
It then went on to add (at 6531):
"To the extent that the alleged confidential information might have been relevant, the company should at least have indicated the nature of the information which it refused to disclose to the appellant and should then have sought ways of making the nub of the information available without prejudice to the company's interests."
It appears from the evidence and the minutes of the various meetings between the company, NUMSA and the other unions that the company was prepared to, and did in fact, divulge, at least in general terms, important aspects of the CAG report. From its point of view it went as far as it could without harming or prejudicing its business interests and prospects. It was even prepared to offer the full report to NUMSA in return for a guarantee of confidentiality. NUMSA claimed it was unable to give the guarantee sought. The reasons advanced by it for its inability to do so are not entirely convincing, but there is no need to embark upon a consideration of them. By making the offer the company demonstrated its
20
willingness to make the fullest possible disclosure provided
confidentiality was adequately protected. There is no reason to believe that its offer was not a genuine one.
The finding of the LAC that the company could simply have
blocked out the details in the CAG report which it sought to keep
secret is in my view flawed as it overlooks the realities of the
situation. First, NUMSA throughout insisted upon having sight of
the full report. Its attitude in this respect was seemingly based
upon a wrong and unjustified perception that the company was
unfairly trying to withhold relevant information from it. It is
therefore unlikely that it would have been satisfied with anything
less than the full report. There was certainly no evidence on its
behalf to suggest the contrary. Second, what would have been
blocked out would have been the very information which the
company had declined to furnish because of its confidential nature
and on which NUMSA was insisting. With this information
blocked out NUMSA would have been in no better a position than
21 it was; by the same token the company would not be providing any
more information than it already had. Blocking out parts of the
report would therefore have served no purpose.
On appeal there was a subtle shift in emphasis in relation to
the matter of alleged non-disclosure. It was argued on behalf of
NUMSA that it was the company's responsibility to "manage", the
information at its disposal. Apart from the question of blocking
out parts of the CAG report, it was contended that there were
relevant non-confidential aspects of the report that the company
could and should of its own initiative have disclosed to NUMSA in
fulfilment of its duty to make proper disclosure. Two such aspects
were raised in argument. They were (1) the number of
retrenchments envisaged on a department to department basis and
(2) the fact that the retrenchment programme was due to extend
over a period of two years. It can be accepted for present
purposes that no valid reason existed why the company could not
have passed this information on to NUMSA. Non constat that its
22 failure to do so constituted a breach of its obligation to consult fully
and fairly.
With regard to (1), NUMSA was in the nature of things fully
alive to the fact that the company operated in different departments.
According to Mr Olifant, a NUMSA shop steward, the information
made available by the company with regard to the possible number
of retrenchments, expressed in percentages, made it impossible to
determine how many employees were to be retrenched per
department. If this information was considered by it at the time
to be relevant to the consultative process, NUMSA could
specifically have asked the company for the necessary details. It
apparently never did so at any of the five meetings, or at any other
time. Much the same situation pertains to (2). NUMSA knew that
the issue of retrenchment had arisen in 1990 but that retrenchment
had successfully been avoided; it must have been alive to the
reasonable possibility that the issue could arise again in future.
There was nothing which precluded NUMSA from enquiring of the
23 company whether it envisaged further retrenchments. Neither of
these matters was specifically raised at the Industrial Court hearing.
Olifant did not stress the need for such information, or its
importance to NUMSA; the company's witnesses were never called
upon to explain why the information was not passed on to NUMSA.
There is nothing to indicate that the company would have refused
to furnish the information if asked for it. Nor was it suggested by
Olifant that the information would have enabled NUMSA to make
a meaningful contribution to the resolution of the retrenchment
issue. The inference is irresistible that NUMSA did not regard the
information as particularly relevant or significant at the time; by
the same token the company may have regarded the matter (possibly
wrongly) in the same light. Whatever the position, the company's
failure to disclose the information, when NUMSA could reasonably
have sought and obtained it, cannot be said to have been materially
unfair.
In determining whether or not there has been an unfair labour
24 practice the court is ultimately required "to exercise its moral
judgment in order to ascertain the right and justice of the case"
(Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press
Corporation of South Africa Ltd ('Perskor') 1992(4) SA 791(A) at
796H). The court's view as to what is fair in the circumstances "is
the essential determinant in deciding the ultimate question" (Supra
at 798G). Its decision "is the passing of a moral judgment on a
combination of findings of fact and opinions" (supra at 798I).
Applying this approach to the present matter it cannot in my
view be said, on an overall conspectus of all the relevant facts and
circumstances, that the company acted unreasonably in the sense
that it failed to consult fully and fairly with its employees (through
NUMSA and the other unions), as it was required to do, in relation
to the retrenchment issue. It follows that the company was not
guilty of an unfair labour practice. This finding renders it
unnecessary to consider whether it was competent for the LAC to
have made a determination in the form in which it did.
25 In the result the appeal is allowed, the determination of the
Labour Appeal Court is set aside, and the finding of the Industrial
Court that the appellant did not commit an unfair labour practice, is
restored.
J W SMALBERGER JUDGE OF APPEAL
HOEXTER, JA) KUMLEBEN, JA) concur NIENABER, JA ) HOWIE, JA)